Обсуждение: Hardening PostgreSQL via (optional) ban on local file system access
Hi Pgsql-Hackers As part of ongoing work on PostgreSQL security hardening we have added a capability to disable all file system access (COPY TO/FROM [PROGRAM] <filename>, pg_*file*() functions, lo_*() functions accessing files, etc) in a way that can not be re-enabled without already having access to the file system. That is via a flag which can be set only in postgresql.conf or on the command line. Currently the file system access is controlled via being a SUPREUSER or having the pg_read_server_files, pg_write_server_files and pg_execute_server_program roles. The problem with this approach is that it will not stop an attacker who has managed to become the PostgreSQL SUPERUSER from breaking out of the server to reading and writing files and running programs in the surrounding container, VM or OS. If we had had this then for example the infamous 2020 PgCrypto worm [1] would have been much less likely to succeed. So here are a few questions to get discussion started. 1) would it be enough to just disable WRITING to the filesystem (COPY ... TO ..., COPY TO ... PROGRAM ...) or are some reading functions also potentially exploitable or at least making attackers life easier ? 2) should configuration be all-or-nothing or more fine-tunable (maybe a comma-separated list of allowed features) ? 3) should this be back-patched (we can provide batches for all supported PgSQL versions) 4) We should likely start with this flag off, but any paranoid (read - good and security conscious) DBA can turn it on. 5) Which file access functions should be in the unsafe list - pg_current_logfile is likely safe as is pg_relation_filenode, but pg_ls_dir likely is not. some subversions might be ok again, like pg_ls_waldir ? 6) or should we control it via disabling the pg_*_server_* roles for different take of configuration from 5) ? As I said, we are happy to provide patches (and docs, etc) for all the PostgreSQL versions we decide to support here. Best Regards Hannu ----- [1] https://www.securityweek.com/pgminer-crypto-mining-botnet-abuses-postgresql-distribution
Re: Hardening PostgreSQL via (optional) ban on local file system access
От
"David G. Johnston"
Дата:
On Fri, Jun 24, 2022 at 3:08 PM Hannu Krosing <hannuk@google.com> wrote:
1) would it be enough to just disable WRITING to the filesystem (COPY
... TO ..., COPY TO ... PROGRAM ...) or are some reading functions
also potentially exploitable or at least making attackers life easier
?
I would protect read paths as well as write ones.
Though ISTM reading would need to be more fine-grained - raw filesystem reads and system reads (i.e., something like get_raw_page(...))
2) should configuration be all-or-nothing or more fine-tunable (maybe
a comma-separated list of allowed features) ?
First pass, all-or-nothing, focus on architecture and identification. Ideally we can then easily go in and figure out specific capabilities that need to be enumerated should we desire. Or, as noted below, figure out how to do a DBA administered whitelist.
3) should this be back-patched (we can provide batches for all
supported PgSQL versions)
I would love to in theory, but to do this right I suspect that the amount of desirable refactoring would make doing so prohibitive.
4) We should likely start with this flag off, but any paranoid (read -
good and security conscious) DBA can turn it on.
In the end the vast majority of our users will have the decision as to the default state of this decided for them by their distribution or service provider. I'm fine with having build-from-source users get the more permissive default.
5) Which file access functions should be in the unsafe list -
pg_current_logfile is likely safe as is pg_relation_filenode, but
pg_ls_dir likely is not. some subversions might be ok again, like
pg_ls_waldir ?
6) or should we control it via disabling the pg_*_server_* roles for
different take of configuration from 5) ?
I would suggest neither: we should funnel user-initiated access to the filesystem, for read and write, through its own API that will simply prevent all writes (and maybe reads) based upon this flag. If we can somehow enforce that a C coded extension also use this API we should do so, but IIUC that is not possible.
This basically puts things in a "default deny" mode. I do think that we need something that permits a filesystem user to then say "except these" (i.e., a whitelist). The thing added to the whitelist should be available in the PostgreSQL log file when the API rejects the attempt to access the filesystem. Unfortunately, at the moment I hit a brick wall when thinking exactly how that could be accomplished. At least, in a minimal/zero trust type of setup. Having the API access include the module, function, and version making the request and having a semantic versioning based whitelist (like, e.g., npm) would work sufficiently well in a "the only ones that get installed on the server are trusted to play by the rules" setup.
Probably over-engineering it like I have a tendency to do, but some food for thought nonetheless.
David J.
On Sat, Jun 25, 2022 at 12:08:13AM +0200, Hannu Krosing wrote: > As part of ongoing work on PostgreSQL security hardening we have > added a capability to disable all file system access (COPY TO/FROM > [PROGRAM] <filename>, pg_*file*() functions, lo_*() functions > accessing files, etc) in a way that can not be re-enabled without > already having access to the file system. That is via a flag which can > be set only in postgresql.conf or on the command line. > > Currently the file system access is controlled via being a SUPREUSER > or having the pg_read_server_files, pg_write_server_files and > pg_execute_server_program roles. The problem with this approach is > that it will not stop an attacker who has managed to become the > PostgreSQL SUPERUSER from breaking out of the server to reading and > writing files and running programs in the surrounding container, VM or > OS. There was some recent discussion in this area you might be interested in [0]. [0] https://postgr.es/m/20220520225619.GA876272%40nathanxps13 -- Nathan Bossart Amazon Web Services: https://aws.amazon.com
Hi, On 2022-06-25 00:08:13 +0200, Hannu Krosing wrote: > Currently the file system access is controlled via being a SUPREUSER > or having the pg_read_server_files, pg_write_server_files and > pg_execute_server_program roles. The problem with this approach is > that it will not stop an attacker who has managed to become the > PostgreSQL SUPERUSER from breaking out of the server to reading and > writing files and running programs in the surrounding container, VM or > OS. If a user has superuser rights, they automatically can execute arbitrary code. It's that simple. Removing roles isn't going to change that. Our code doesn't protect against C functions mismatching their SQL level definitions. With that you can do a lot of things. > If we had had this then for example the infamous 2020 PgCrypto worm > [1] would have been much less likely to succeed. Meh. > So here are a few questions to get discussion started. > > 1) would it be enough to just disable WRITING to the filesystem (COPY > ... TO ..., COPY TO ... PROGRAM ...) or are some reading functions > also potentially exploitable or at least making attackers life easier > ? > 2) should configuration be all-or-nothing or more fine-tunable (maybe > a comma-separated list of allowed features) ? > 3) should this be back-patched (we can provide batches for all > supported PgSQL versions) Err, what? > 4) We should likely start with this flag off, but any paranoid (read - > good and security conscious) DBA can turn it on. > 5) Which file access functions should be in the unsafe list - > pg_current_logfile is likely safe as is pg_relation_filenode, but > pg_ls_dir likely is not. some subversions might be ok again, like > pg_ls_waldir ? > 6) or should we control it via disabling the pg_*_server_* roles for > different take of configuration from 5) ? > > As I said, we are happy to provide patches (and docs, etc) for all the > PostgreSQL versions we decide to support here. I don't see anything here that provides a meaningful increase in security. Greetings, Andres Freund
On Sat, Jun 25, 2022 at 1:13 AM Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de> wrote: > > Hi, > > On 2022-06-25 00:08:13 +0200, Hannu Krosing wrote: > > Currently the file system access is controlled via being a SUPREUSER > > or having the pg_read_server_files, pg_write_server_files and > > pg_execute_server_program roles. The problem with this approach is > > that it will not stop an attacker who has managed to become the > > PostgreSQL SUPERUSER from breaking out of the server to reading and > > writing files and running programs in the surrounding container, VM or > > OS. > > If a user has superuser rights, they automatically can execute arbitrary > code. It's that simple. Removing roles isn't going to change that. Our code > doesn't protect against C functions mismatching their SQL level > definitions. With that you can do a lot of things. Are you claiming that one can manipulate PostgreSQL to do any file writes directly by manipulating pg_proc to call the functions "in a wrong way" ? My impression was that this was largely fixed via disabling the old direct file calling convention, but then again I did not pay much attention at that time :) So your suggestion would be to also include disabling access to at least pg_proc for creating C and internal functions and possibly some other system tables to remove this threat ? Cheers Hannu
On Sat, Jun 25, 2022 at 1:23 AM Hannu Krosing <hannuk@google.com> wrote: > My impression was that this was largely fixed via disabling the old > direct file calling convention, but then again I did not pay much > attention at that time :) I meant of course direct FUNCTION calling convention (Version 0 Calling Conventions) -- Hannu
Re: Hardening PostgreSQL via (optional) ban on local file system access
От
"David G. Johnston"
Дата:
On Fri, Jun 24, 2022 at 4:13 PM Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de> wrote:
Hi,
On 2022-06-25 00:08:13 +0200, Hannu Krosing wrote:
> Currently the file system access is controlled via being a SUPREUSER
> or having the pg_read_server_files, pg_write_server_files and
> pg_execute_server_program roles. The problem with this approach is
> that it will not stop an attacker who has managed to become the
> PostgreSQL SUPERUSER from breaking out of the server to reading and
> writing files and running programs in the surrounding container, VM or
> OS.
If a user has superuser rights, they automatically can execute arbitrary
code. It's that simple. Removing roles isn't going to change that. Our code
doesn't protect against C functions mismatching their SQL level
definitions. With that you can do a lot of things.
Using only psql connected by the postgres role, without touching the filesystem to bootstrap your attack, how would this be done? If you specify CREATE FUNCTION ... LANGUAGE c you have to supply filename references, not a code body and you won't have been able to put that code on the server.
We should be capable of having the core server be inescapable to the filesystem for a superuser logged in remotely. All such access they can do with the filesystem would be mediated by controlled code/APIs.
C-based extensions would be an issue without a solution that does provide an inescapable sandbox aside from going through our API. Which I suspect is basically impossible given our forked process driven execution model.
David J.
David J.
On Fri, Jun 24, 2022 at 4:13 PM Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de> wrote: > On 2022-06-25 00:08:13 +0200, Hannu Krosing wrote: > > 3) should this be back-patched (we can provide batches for all > > supported PgSQL versions) > > Err, what? Translation: Backpatching these changes to any stable versions will not be acceptable (per the project versioning policy [1]), since these changes would be considered new feature. These changes can break installations, if released in a minor version. [1]: https://www.postgresql.org/support/versioning/ Best regards, Gurjeet http://Gurje.et
My understanding was that unless activated by admin these changes would change nothing. And they would be (borderline :) ) security fixes And the versioning policy link actually does not say anything about not adding features to older versions (I know this is the policy, just pointing out the info in not on that page). On Sat, Jun 25, 2022 at 1:46 AM Gurjeet Singh <gurjeet@singh.im> wrote: > > On Fri, Jun 24, 2022 at 4:13 PM Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de> wrote: > > On 2022-06-25 00:08:13 +0200, Hannu Krosing wrote: > > > > 3) should this be back-patched (we can provide batches for all > > > supported PgSQL versions) > > > > Err, what? > > Translation: Backpatching these changes to any stable versions will > not be acceptable (per the project versioning policy [1]), since these > changes would be considered new feature. These changes can break > installations, if released in a minor version. > > [1]: https://www.postgresql.org/support/versioning/ > > Best regards, > Gurjeet > http://Gurje.et
Re: Hardening PostgreSQL via (optional) ban on local file system access
От
"David G. Johnston"
Дата:
On Friday, June 24, 2022, Gurjeet Singh <gurjeet@singh.im> wrote:
On Fri, Jun 24, 2022 at 4:13 PM Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de> wrote:
> On 2022-06-25 00:08:13 +0200, Hannu Krosing wrote:
> > 3) should this be back-patched (we can provide batches for all
> > supported PgSQL versions)
>
> Err, what?
Translation: Backpatching these changes to any stable versions will
not be acceptable (per the project versioning policy [1]), since these
changes would be considered new feature. These changes can break
installations, if released in a minor version.
No longer having the public schema in the search_path was a feature that got back-patched, with known bad consequences, without any way for the DBA to voice their opinion on the matter. This proposal seems similar enough to at least ask the question, with full DBA control and no known bad consequences.
David J.
The old versions should definitely not have it turned on by default. I
probably was not as clear as I thought in bringing out that point..
For upcoming next ones the distributors may want to turn it on for
some more security-conscious ("enterprize") distributions.
-- Hannu
On Sat, Jun 25, 2022 at 2:08 AM David G. Johnston
<david.g.johnston@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, June 24, 2022, Gurjeet Singh <gurjeet@singh.im> wrote:
>>
>> On Fri, Jun 24, 2022 at 4:13 PM Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de> wrote:
>> > On 2022-06-25 00:08:13 +0200, Hannu Krosing wrote:
>>
>> > > 3) should this be back-patched (we can provide batches for all
>> > > supported PgSQL versions)
>> >
>> > Err, what?
>>
>> Translation: Backpatching these changes to any stable versions will
>> not be acceptable (per the project versioning policy [1]), since these
>> changes would be considered new feature. These changes can break
>> installations, if released in a minor version.
>>
>
> No longer having the public schema in the search_path was a feature that got back-patched, with known bad
consequences,without any way for the DBA to voice their opinion on the matter. This proposal seems similar enough to
atleast ask the question, with full DBA control and no known bad consequences.
>
> David J.
>
(fixed your top-posting) On Fri, Jun 24, 2022 at 4:59 PM Hannu Krosing <hannuk@google.com> wrote: > On Sat, Jun 25, 2022 at 1:46 AM Gurjeet Singh <gurjeet@singh.im> wrote: > > > > On Fri, Jun 24, 2022 at 4:13 PM Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de> wrote: > > > On 2022-06-25 00:08:13 +0200, Hannu Krosing wrote: > > > > > > 3) should this be back-patched (we can provide batches for all > > > > supported PgSQL versions) > > > > > > Err, what? > > > > Translation: Backpatching these changes to any stable versions will > > not be acceptable (per the project versioning policy [1]), since these > > changes would be considered new feature. These changes can break > > installations, if released in a minor version. > > > > [1]: https://www.postgresql.org/support/versioning/ > > My understanding was that unless activated by admin these changes > would change nothing. > > And they would be (borderline :) ) security fixes > > And the versioning policy link actually does not say anything about > not adding features to older versions (I know this is the policy, just > pointing out the info in not on that page). I wanted to be sure before I mentioned it, and also because I've been away from the community for a few years [1], so I too searched the page for any relevant mentions of the word "feature" on that page. While you're correct that the policy does not address/prohibit addition of new features in minor releases, but the following line from the policy comes very close to saying it, without actually saying it. > ... PostgreSQL minor releases fix only frequently-encountered bugs, security issues, and data corruption problems to reducethe risk associated with upgrading ... Like I recently heard a "wise one" recently say: "oh those [Postgres] docs are totally unclear[,] but they're technically correct". BTW, the "Translation" bit was for folks new to, or not familiar with, community and its lingo; I'm sure you already knew what Andres meant :-) [1]: I'll milk the "I've been away from the community for a few years" excuse for as long as possible ;-) Best regards, Gurjeet http://Gurje.et
Hi, On 2022-06-25 01:23:36 +0200, Hannu Krosing wrote: > Are you claiming that one can manipulate PostgreSQL to do any file > writes directly by manipulating pg_proc to call the functions "in a > wrong way" ? Yes. > My impression was that this was largely fixed via disabling the old > direct file calling convention, but then again I did not pay much > attention at that time :) It got a tad harder, that's all. > So your suggestion would be to also include disabling access to at > least pg_proc for creating C and internal functions and possibly some > other system tables to remove this threat ? No. I seriously doubt that pursuing this makes sense. Fundamentally, if you found a way to escalate to superuser, you're superuser. Superuser can create extensions etc. That's game over. Done. You can of course make postgres drop a few privileges, to make it harder to turn escalation-to-superuser into wider access to the whole system. That could very well make sense - but of course there's quite a few things that postgres needs to do to work, so there's significant limits to what you can do. Greetings, Andres Freund
(please don't top-post. Surely you've been around this community long enough to know that)
On Sat, Jun 25, 2022 at 1:59 AM Hannu Krosing <hannuk@google.com> wrote:
My understanding was that unless activated by admin these changes
would change nothing.
That is assuming you can do this with changing just a couple of lines of code. Which you will not be able to do. The risk of back patching something like that even if off by default is *way* too large.
And they would be (borderline :) ) security fixes
No, they would not. Not anymore than adding a new authentication method for example could be considered a security fix.
And the versioning policy link actually does not say anything about
not adding features to older versions (I know this is the policy, just
pointing out the info in not on that page).
Yes it does:
The PostgreSQL Global Development Group releases a new major version containing new features about once a year. Each major version receives bug fixes and, if need be, security fixes that are released at least once every three months in what we call a "minor release."
And slightly further down:
While upgrading will always contain some level of risk, PostgreSQL minor releases fix only frequently-encountered bugs, security issues, and data corruption problems to reduce the risk associated with upgrading.
So unless you claim this is a frequently encountered bug (it's not -- it's acting exactly has intentional), security issue (same) or data corruption (unrelated), it should not go in a minor version. It's very clear.
On Sat, Jun 25, 2022 at 1:13 AM Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de> wrote:
On 2022-06-25 00:08:13 +0200, Hannu Krosing wrote:
> Currently the file system access is controlled via being a SUPREUSER
> or having the pg_read_server_files, pg_write_server_files and
> pg_execute_server_program roles. The problem with this approach is
> that it will not stop an attacker who has managed to become the
> PostgreSQL SUPERUSER from breaking out of the server to reading and
> writing files and running programs in the surrounding container, VM or
> OS.
If a user has superuser rights, they automatically can execute arbitrary
code. It's that simple. Removing roles isn't going to change that. Our code
doesn't protect against C functions mismatching their SQL level
definitions. With that you can do a lot of things.
Yeah, trying to close this hole is a *very* large architectural change.
I think a much better use of time is to further reduce the *need* to use superuser to the point that the vast majority of installations can run without having it. For example the addition of the pg_monitor role has made a huge difference to the number of things needing superuser access. As doe the "grantable gucs" in 15, for example. Enumerating what remaining things can be done safely without such access and working on turning that into grantable permissions or roles will be a much safer way to work on the underlying problem (which definitely is a real one), and as a bonus that gives a more granular control over things even *beyond* just the file system access.
> On 25 Jun 2022, at 03:08, Hannu Krosing <hannuk@google.com> wrote: > > Currently the file system access is controlled via being a SUPREUSER My 2 cents. Ongoing work on making superuser access unneeded seems much more relevant to me. IMO superuser == full OS access available from postgres process. I think there's uncountable set of ways to affect OS fromsuperuser. E.g. you can create a TOAST value compressed by pglz that allows you to look few kilobytes before detoasted datum. Or makean archive_command = 'gcc my shell code'. It's not even funny to invent things that you can hack as a superuser. Best regards, Andrey Borodin.
What are your ideas of applying a change similar to above to actually being a superuser ? That is adding a check for "superuser being currently available" to function superuser() in ./src/backend/utils/misc/superuser.c ? It could be as simple as a flag that can be set only at startup for maximum speed - though the places needing superuser check are never in speed-critical path as far as I have seen. Or it could be more complex and dynamix, like having a file similar to pg_hba.conf that defines the ability to run code as superuser based on a set of attributes each of which could be * meaning "any" These could be * database (to limit superuser to only certain databases) * session user (to allow only some users to become superuser, including via SECURITY DEFINER functions) * backend pid (this would allow kind of 2-factor authentication - connect, then use that session's pid to add a row to pg_ok_to_be_sup.conf file, then continue with your superuser-y stuff) * valid-until - this lets one allow superuser for a limited period without fear of forgetting top disable it This approach would have the the benefit of being very low-code while delivering the extra protection of needing pre-existing access to filesystem to enable/disable . For easiest usability the pg_ok_to_be_sup.conf file should be outside pg_reload_conf() - either just read each time the superuser() check is run, or watched via inotify and reloaded each time it changes. Cheers, Hannu P.S: - thanks Magnus for the "please don't top-post" notice - I also need to remember to check if all the quoted mail history is left in when I just write a replay without touching any of it. I hope it does the right thing and leaves it out, but it just might unders some conditions bluntly append it anyway just in case :)
Having a superuser.conf file could also be used to solve another issue - currently, if you remove the SUPERUSER attribute from all users your only option to get it back would be to run in single-user mode. With conf file one could add an "always" option there which makes any matching user superuser to fix whatever needs fixing as superuser. Cheers Hannu On Sat, Jun 25, 2022 at 10:54 PM Hannu Krosing <hannuk@google.com> wrote: > > What are your ideas of applying a change similar to above to actually > being a superuser ? > > That is adding a check for "superuser being currently available" to > function superuser() in > ./src/backend/utils/misc/superuser.c ? > > It could be as simple as a flag that can be set only at startup for > maximum speed - though the places needing superuser check are never in > speed-critical path as far as I have seen. > > Or it could be more complex and dynamix, like having a file similar to > pg_hba.conf that defines the ability to run code as superuser based on > a set of attributes each of which could be * meaning "any" > > These could be > * database (to limit superuser to only certain databases) > * session user (to allow only some users to become superuser, > including via SECURITY DEFINER functions) > * backend pid (this would allow kind of 2-factor authentication - > connect, then use that session's pid to add a row to > pg_ok_to_be_sup.conf file, then continue with your superuser-y stuff) > * valid-until - this lets one allow superuser for a limited period > without fear of forgetting top disable it > > This approach would have the the benefit of being very low-code while > delivering the extra protection of needing pre-existing access to > filesystem to enable/disable . > > For easiest usability the pg_ok_to_be_sup.conf file should be outside > pg_reload_conf() - either just read each time the superuser() check is > run, or watched via inotify and reloaded each time it changes. > > Cheers, > Hannu > > P.S: - thanks Magnus for the "please don't top-post" notice - I also > need to remember to check if all the quoted mail history is left in > when I just write a replay without touching any of it. I hope it does > the right thing and leaves it out, but it just might unders some > conditions bluntly append it anyway just in case :)
On Sat, 2022-06-25 at 00:08 +0200, Hannu Krosing wrote:
> Hi Pgsql-Hackers
>
> As part of ongoing work on PostgreSQL security hardening we have
> added a capability to disable all file system access (COPY TO/FROM
> [PROGRAM] <filename>, pg_*file*() functions, lo_*() functions
> accessing files, etc) in a way that can not be re-enabled without
> already having access to the file system. That is via a flag which
> can
> be set only in postgresql.conf or on the command line.
How much of this can be done as a special extension already?
For instance, a ProcessUtility_hook can prevent superuser from
executing COPY TO/FROM PROGRAM.
As others point out, that would still leave a lot of surface area for
attacks, e.g. by manipulating the catalog. But it could be a starting
place to make attacks "harder", without core postgres needing to make
security promises that will be hard to keep.
Regards,
Jeff Davis
My current thinking is (based on more insights from Andres) that we should also have a startup flag to disable superuser altogether to avoid bypasses via direct manipulation of pg_proc. Experience shows that 99% of the time one can run PostgreSQL just fine without a superuser, so having a superuser available all the time is kind of like leaving a loaded gun on the kitchen table because you sometimes need to go hunting. I am especially waiting for Andres' feedback on viability this approach. Cheers Hannu On Mon, Jun 27, 2022 at 10:37 PM Jeff Davis <pgsql@j-davis.com> wrote: > > On Sat, 2022-06-25 at 00:08 +0200, Hannu Krosing wrote: > > Hi Pgsql-Hackers > > > > As part of ongoing work on PostgreSQL security hardening we have > > added a capability to disable all file system access (COPY TO/FROM > > [PROGRAM] <filename>, pg_*file*() functions, lo_*() functions > > accessing files, etc) in a way that can not be re-enabled without > > already having access to the file system. That is via a flag which > > can > > be set only in postgresql.conf or on the command line. > > How much of this can be done as a special extension already? > > For instance, a ProcessUtility_hook can prevent superuser from > executing COPY TO/FROM PROGRAM. > > As others point out, that would still leave a lot of surface area for > attacks, e.g. by manipulating the catalog. But it could be a starting > place to make attacks "harder", without core postgres needing to make > security promises that will be hard to keep. > > Regards, > Jeff Davis > >
On Mon, 2022-06-27 at 23:36 +0200, Hannu Krosing wrote:
> My current thinking is (based on more insights from Andres) that we
> should also have a startup flag to disable superuser altogether to
> avoid bypasses via direct manipulation of pg_proc.
What do you mean by "disable superuser altogether"? What about SECURITY
DEFINER functions, or extension install scripts, or background workers
created by extensions?
Do you mean prevent logging in as superuser and prevent SET ROLE to
superuser? What if a user *becomes* superuser in the middle of a
session?
If we go down this road, I wonder if we should reconsider the idea of
changing superuser status of an existing role. Changing superuser
status already creates some weirdness. We could go so far as to say you
can only create/drop superusers via a tool or config file when the
server is shut down.
I don't think I've ever used more than a couple superusers, and I don't
think I've had a good reason to change superuser status of an existing
user before, except as a hack to have non-superuser-owned
subscriptions. There are probably better solutions to that problem. [CC
Mark as he may be interested in this discussion.]
Regards,
Jeff Davis
On Mon, Jun 27, 2022 at 5:37 PM Hannu Krosing <hannuk@google.com> wrote: > My current thinking is (based on more insights from Andres) that we > should also have a startup flag to disable superuser altogether to > avoid bypasses via direct manipulation of pg_proc. > > Experience shows that 99% of the time one can run PostgreSQL just fine > without a superuser, so having a superuser available all the time is > kind of like leaving a loaded gun on the kitchen table because you > sometimes need to go hunting. > > I am especially waiting for Andres' feedback on viability this approach. Well, I'm not Andres but I don't think not having a superuser at all is in any way a viable approach. It's necessary to be able to administer the database system, and the bootstrap superuser can't be removed outright in any case because it owns a ton of objects. There are basically two ways of trying to solve this problem. On the one hand we could try to create a mode in which the privileges of the superuser are restricted enough that the superuser can't break out to the operating system. The list of things that would need to be blocked is, I think, more extensive than any list you've give so far. The other is to stick with the idea of an unrestricted superuser but come up with ways of giving a controlled subset of the superuser's privileges to a non-superuser. I believe this is the more promising approach, and there have been multiple discussion threads about it in the last six months. -- Robert Haas EDB: http://www.enterprisedb.com
I was not after *completely* removing it, but just having an option which makes the superuser() function always return false. For known cases of needing a superuser there would be a way to enable it , perhaps via a sentinel file or pg_hba-like configuration file. And as first cut I would advocate for disabling SECURITY DEFINER functions for simplicity and robustness of defense. A short term solution for these would be to re-write them in C (or Go or Rust or any other compiled language) as C functions have full access anyway. But C functions fall in the same category as other defenses discussed at the start of this thread - namely to use them, you already need access to the file system. Running production databases without superuser available is not as impossible as you may think - Cloud SQL version of PostgreSQL has been in use with great success for years without exposing a real superuser to end users (there are some places where `cloudsqlsuperuser` gives you partial superuser'y abilities). Letting user turn off the superuser access when no known need for it exists (which is 99.9% in must use cases) would improve secondary defenses noticeably. It would also be a good start to figuring out the set of roles into which one can decompose superuser access in longer run -- Hannu On Tue, Jun 28, 2022 at 8:30 PM Robert Haas <robertmhaas@gmail.com> wrote: > > On Mon, Jun 27, 2022 at 5:37 PM Hannu Krosing <hannuk@google.com> wrote: > > My current thinking is (based on more insights from Andres) that we > > should also have a startup flag to disable superuser altogether to > > avoid bypasses via direct manipulation of pg_proc. > > > > Experience shows that 99% of the time one can run PostgreSQL just fine > > without a superuser, so having a superuser available all the time is > > kind of like leaving a loaded gun on the kitchen table because you > > sometimes need to go hunting. > > > > I am especially waiting for Andres' feedback on viability this approach. > > Well, I'm not Andres but I don't think not having a superuser at all > is in any way a viable approach. It's necessary to be able to > administer the database system, and the bootstrap superuser can't be > removed outright in any case because it owns a ton of objects. > > There are basically two ways of trying to solve this problem. On the > one hand we could try to create a mode in which the privileges of the > superuser are restricted enough that the superuser can't break out to > the operating system. The list of things that would need to be blocked > is, I think, more extensive than any list you've give so far. The > other is to stick with the idea of an unrestricted superuser but come > up with ways of giving a controlled subset of the superuser's > privileges to a non-superuser. I believe this is the more promising > approach, and there have been multiple discussion threads about it in > the last six months. > > -- > Robert Haas > EDB: http://www.enterprisedb.com
Hi, On 2022-06-27 23:36:53 +0200, Hannu Krosing wrote: > My current thinking is (based on more insights from Andres) that we > should also have a startup flag to disable superuser altogether to > avoid bypasses via direct manipulation of pg_proc. To me that makes no sense whatsoever. You're not going to be able to create extensions etc anymore. > Experience shows that 99% of the time one can run PostgreSQL just fine > without a superuser IME that's not at all true. It might not be needed interactively, but that's not all the same as not being needed at all. IMO this whole thread is largely poking at the wrong side of the issue. A superuser is a superuser is a superuser. There's reasons superusers exist, because lots of operations are fundamentally not safe. IMO removing superuser or making superuser not be a superuser is a fool's errand - time is much better spent reducing the number of tasks that need superuser. Greetings, Andres Freund
On Tue, 2022-06-28 at 23:18 +0200, Hannu Krosing wrote:
> I was not after *completely* removing it, but just having an option
> which makes the superuser() function always return false.
Did you test that? I'm guessing that would cause lots of problems,
e.g., installing extensions.
Regards,
Jeff Davis
On Tue, 2022-06-28 at 16:27 -0700, Andres Freund wrote: > > Experience shows that 99% of the time one can run PostgreSQL just fine > > without a superuser > > IME that's not at all true. It might not be needed interactively, but that's > not all the same as not being needed at all. I also disagree with that. Not having a superuser is one of the pain points with using a hosted database: no untrusted procedural languages, no untrusted extensions (unless someone hacked up PostgreSQL or provided a workaround akin to a SECURITY DEFINER function), etc. Yours, Laurenz Albe
Hi, On 2022-06-29 08:51:10 +0200, Laurenz Albe wrote: > On Tue, 2022-06-28 at 16:27 -0700, Andres Freund wrote: > > > Experience shows that 99% of the time one can run PostgreSQL just fine > > > without a superuser > > > > IME that's not at all true. It might not be needed interactively, but that's > > not all the same as not being needed at all. > > I also disagree with that. Not having a superuser is one of the pain > points with using a hosted database: no untrusted procedural languages, > no untrusted extensions (unless someone hacked up PostgreSQL or provided > a workaround akin to a SECURITY DEFINER function), etc. I'm not sure what exactly you're disagreeing with? I'm not saying that superuser isn't needed interactively in general, just that there are reasonably common scenarios in which that's the case. Greetings, Andres Freund
The idea is to allow superuser, but only in case you *already* have
access to the file system.
You could think of it as a two factor authentication for using superuser.
So in the simplest implementation it would be
touch $PGDATA/allow_superuser
psql
hannuk=# CREATE EXTENSION ...
rm $PGDATA/allow_superuser
and in more sophisticated implementation it could be
terminal 1:
psql
hannuk=# select pg_backend_pid();
pg_backend_pid
----------------
1749025
(1 row)
terminal 2:
echo 1749025 > $PGDATA/allow_superuser
back to terminal 1 still connected to backend with pid 1749025:
$ CREATE EXTENSION ...
.. and then clean up the sentinel file after, or just make it valid
for N minutes from creation
Cheers,
Hannu Krosing
On Wed, Jun 29, 2022 at 8:51 AM Laurenz Albe <laurenz.albe@cybertec.at> wrote:
>
> On Tue, 2022-06-28 at 16:27 -0700, Andres Freund wrote:
> > > Experience shows that 99% of the time one can run PostgreSQL just fine
> > > without a superuser
> >
> > IME that's not at all true. It might not be needed interactively, but that's
> > not all the same as not being needed at all.
>
> I also disagree with that. Not having a superuser is one of the pain
> points with using a hosted database: no untrusted procedural languages,
> no untrusted extensions (unless someone hacked up PostgreSQL or provided
> a workaround akin to a SECURITY DEFINER function), etc.
>
> Yours,
> Laurenz Albe
On Wed, 2022-06-29 at 00:05 -0700, Andres Freund wrote: > On 2022-06-29 08:51:10 +0200, Laurenz Albe wrote: > > On Tue, 2022-06-28 at 16:27 -0700, Andres Freund wrote: > > > > Experience shows that 99% of the time one can run PostgreSQL just fine > > > > without a superuser > > > > > > IME that's not at all true. It might not be needed interactively, but that's > > > not all the same as not being needed at all. > > > > I also disagree with that. Not having a superuser is one of the pain > > points with using a hosted database: no untrusted procedural languages, > > no untrusted extensions (unless someone hacked up PostgreSQL or provided > > a workaround akin to a SECURITY DEFINER function), etc. > > I'm not sure what exactly you're disagreeing with? I'm not saying that > superuser isn't needed interactively in general, just that there are > reasonably common scenarios in which that's the case. I was unclear, sorry. I agreed with you that you can't do without superuser and disagreed with the claim that 99% of the time nobody needs superuser access. Yours, Laurenz Albe
Ah, I see. My counterclaim was that there are lots of use cases where one would want to be extra sure that *only* they, as the owner of the database, can access the database as a superuser and not someone else. Even if there is some obscure way for that "someone else" to either connect as a superuser or to escalate privileges to superuser. And what I propose would be a means to achieve that at the expense of extra steps when starting to act as a superuser. In a nutshell this would be equivalent for two factor authentication for acting as a superuser - 1) you must be able to log in as a user with superuser attribute 2) you must present proof that you can access the underlying file system Cheers, Hannu Krosing On Wed, Jun 29, 2022 at 12:48 PM Laurenz Albe <laurenz.albe@cybertec.at> wrote: > > On Wed, 2022-06-29 at 00:05 -0700, Andres Freund wrote: > > On 2022-06-29 08:51:10 +0200, Laurenz Albe wrote: > > > On Tue, 2022-06-28 at 16:27 -0700, Andres Freund wrote: > > > > > Experience shows that 99% of the time one can run PostgreSQL just fine > > > > > without a superuser > > > > > > > > IME that's not at all true. It might not be needed interactively, but that's > > > > not all the same as not being needed at all. > > > > > > I also disagree with that. Not having a superuser is one of the pain > > > points with using a hosted database: no untrusted procedural languages, > > > no untrusted extensions (unless someone hacked up PostgreSQL or provided > > > a workaround akin to a SECURITY DEFINER function), etc. > > > > I'm not sure what exactly you're disagreeing with? I'm not saying that > > superuser isn't needed interactively in general, just that there are > > reasonably common scenarios in which that's the case. > > I was unclear, sorry. I agreed with you that you can't do without superuser > and disagreed with the claim that 99% of the time nobody needs superuser > access. > > Yours, > Laurenz Albe
On Wed, Jun 29, 2022 at 3:46 AM Hannu Krosing <hannuk@google.com> wrote: > terminal 1: > psql > hannuk=# select pg_backend_pid(); > pg_backend_pid > ---------------- > 1749025 > (1 row) > > terminal 2: > echo 1749025 > $PGDATA/allow_superuser > > back to terminal 1 still connected to backend with pid 1749025: > $ CREATE EXTENSION ... > > .. and then clean up the sentinel file after, or just make it valid > for N minutes from creation I don't think this would be very convenient in most scenarios, and I think it would also be difficult to implement correctly. I don't think you can get by with just having superuser() return false sometimes despite pg_authid.rolsuper being true. There's a lot of subtle assumptions in the code to the effect that the properties of a session are basically stable unless some SQL is executed which changes things. I think if we start injecting hacks like this it may seem to work in light testing but we'll never get to the end of the bug reports. -- Robert Haas EDB: http://www.enterprisedb.com
On Thu, Jun 30, 2022 at 11:52:20AM -0400, Robert Haas wrote: > I don't think this would be very convenient in most scenarios, and I > think it would also be difficult to implement correctly. I don't think > you can get by with just having superuser() return false sometimes > despite pg_authid.rolsuper being true. There's a lot of subtle > assumptions in the code to the effect that the properties of a session > are basically stable unless some SQL is executed which changes things. > I think if we start injecting hacks like this it may seem to work in > light testing but we'll never get to the end of the bug reports. Yeah, seems it would have to be specified per-session, but how would you specify a specific session before the session starts? -- Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us> https://momjian.us EDB https://enterprisedb.com Indecision is a decision. Inaction is an action. Mark Batterson
On Thu, Jun 30, 2022 at 7:25 PM Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us> wrote: > > On Thu, Jun 30, 2022 at 11:52:20AM -0400, Robert Haas wrote: > > I don't think this would be very convenient in most scenarios, This is the eternal problem with security - more security always includes more inconvenience. Unlocking your door when coming home is more inconvenient than not unlocking it, and the least inconvenient thing would be not having a door at all. Imagine coming to your door with a heavy shopping bag in each hand - at this moment almost anyone would prefer the door not being there :) This one would be for cases where you want best multi-layer protections also against unknown threats and are ready to trade some convenience for security. Also it would not be that bad once you use automated deployment pipelines which just need an extra line to unlock superuser for deployment. > > and I > > think it would also be difficult to implement correctly. I don't think > > you can get by with just having superuser() return false sometimes > > despite pg_authid.rolsuper being true. There's a lot of subtle > > assumptions in the code to the effect that the properties of a session > > are basically stable unless some SQL is executed which changes things. A good barrier SQL for this could be SET ROLE=... . Maybe just have a mode where a superuser can not log in _or_ SET ROLE unless this is explicitly allowed in pg_superuser.conf > > I think if we start injecting hacks like this it may seem to work in > > light testing but we'll never get to the end of the bug reports. In this case it looks like each of these bug reports would mean an avoided security breach which for me looks preferable. Again, this would be all optional, opt-in, DBA-needs-to-set-it-up feature for the professionally paranoid and not something we suddenly force on people who would like to run all their databases using user=postgres database=postgres with trust specified in the pg_hba.conf "because the firewall takes care of security" :) > Yeah, seems it would have to be specified per-session, but how would you > specify a specific session before the session starts? One often recommended way to do superuser'y things in a secure production database is to have a non-privileged NOINHERIT user for logging in and then do SET ROLE=<superuserrole>; when needed, similar to using su/sudo in shell. This practice both reduces the attack surface and also provides auditability by knowing who logged in for superuser work. In this case one could easily get the pid and do the needed extra setup before escalating privileges to superuser. --- Hannu
And thanks to Robert and Bruce for bringing up good points about potential pitfalls! I think we do have a good discussion going on here :) --- Hannu On Fri, Jul 1, 2022 at 11:14 AM Hannu Krosing <hannuk@google.com> wrote: > > On Thu, Jun 30, 2022 at 7:25 PM Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us> wrote: > > > > On Thu, Jun 30, 2022 at 11:52:20AM -0400, Robert Haas wrote: > > > I don't think this would be very convenient in most scenarios, > > This is the eternal problem with security - more security always > includes more inconvenience. > > Unlocking your door when coming home is more inconvenient than not > unlocking it, and the least inconvenient thing would be not having a > door at all. > Imagine coming to your door with a heavy shopping bag in each hand - > at this moment almost anyone would prefer the door not being there :) > > This one would be for cases where you want best multi-layer > protections also against unknown threats and are ready to trade some > convenience for security. Also it would not be that bad once you use > automated deployment pipelines which just need an extra line to unlock > superuser for deployment. > > > > and I > > > think it would also be difficult to implement correctly. I don't think > > > you can get by with just having superuser() return false sometimes > > > despite pg_authid.rolsuper being true. There's a lot of subtle > > > assumptions in the code to the effect that the properties of a session > > > are basically stable unless some SQL is executed which changes things. > > A good barrier SQL for this could be SET ROLE=... . > Maybe just have a mode where a superuser can not log in _or_ SET ROLE > unless this is explicitly allowed in pg_superuser.conf > > > > I think if we start injecting hacks like this it may seem to work in > > > light testing but we'll never get to the end of the bug reports. > > In this case it looks like each of these bug reports would mean an > avoided security breach which for me looks preferable. > > Again, this would be all optional, opt-in, DBA-needs-to-set-it-up > feature for the professionally paranoid and not something we suddenly > force on people who would like to run all their databases using > user=postgres database=postgres with trust specified in the > pg_hba.conf "because the firewall takes care of security" :) > > > Yeah, seems it would have to be specified per-session, but how would you > > specify a specific session before the session starts? > > One often recommended way to do superuser'y things in a secure > production database is to have a non-privileged NOINHERIT user for > logging in and then do > SET ROLE=<superuserrole>; > when needed, similar to using su/sudo in shell. This practice both > reduces the attack surface and also provides auditability by knowing > who logged in for superuser work. > > In this case one could easily get the pid and do the needed extra > setup before escalating privileges to superuser. > > --- > Hannu
On 7/1/22 05:14, Hannu Krosing wrote: > On Thu, Jun 30, 2022 at 7:25 PM Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us> wrote: >> On Thu, Jun 30, 2022 at 11:52:20AM -0400, Robert Haas wrote: >> > I don't think this would be very convenient in most scenarios, > > This is the eternal problem with security - more security always > includes more inconvenience. yep > This one would be for cases where you want best multi-layer > protections also against unknown threats and are ready to trade some > convenience for security. Also it would not be that bad once you use > automated deployment pipelines which just need an extra line to unlock > superuser for deployment. +1 >>> and I think it would also be difficult to implement correctly. I >>> don't think you can get by with just having superuser() return >>> false sometimes despite pg_authid.rolsuper being true. There's a >>> lot of subtle assumptions in the code to the effect that the >>> properties of a session are basically stable unless some SQL is >>> executed which changes things. > A good barrier SQL for this could be SET ROLE=... . > Maybe just have a mode where a superuser can not log in _or_ SET ROLE > unless this is explicitly allowed in pg_superuser.conf Agreed. In fact in a recent discussion with Joshua Brindle (CC'd) he wished for a way that we could designate the current session "tainted". For example if role joe with membership in postgres should always be logging in from 192.168.42.0/24 when performing admin duties as postgres, but logs in from elsewhere their session should be marked tainted and escalating to postgres should be denied. >> > I think if we start injecting hacks like this it may seem to work in >> > light testing but we'll never get to the end of the bug reports. > > In this case it looks like each of these bug reports would mean an > avoided security breach which for me looks preferable. > > Again, this would be all optional, opt-in, DBA-needs-to-set-it-up > feature for the professionally paranoid and not something we suddenly > force on people who would like to run all their databases using > user=postgres database=postgres with trust specified in the > pg_hba.conf "because the firewall takes care of security" :) > >> Yeah, seems it would have to be specified per-session, but how would you >> specify a specific session before the session starts? > > One often recommended way to do superuser'y things in a secure > production database is to have a non-privileged NOINHERIT user for > logging in and then do > SET ROLE=<superuserrole>; > when needed, similar to using su/sudo in shell. This practice both > reduces the attack surface and also provides auditability by knowing > who logged in for superuser work. +many -- Joe Conway RDS Open Source Databases Amazon Web Services: https://aws.amazon.com
On Fri, Jul 1, 2022 at 5:15 AM Hannu Krosing <hannuk@google.com> wrote: > This is the eternal problem with security - more security always > includes more inconvenience. But the same amount of security can be more or less inconvenient, and I don't think your proposal does very well there. More inconvenience doesn't mean more security. I actually think this whole line of attack is probably a dead end. My preferred approach is to find ways of delegating a larger subset of superuser privileges to non-superusers, or to prevent people from assuming the superuser role in the first place. Trying to restrict what superusers can do seems like a much more difficult path, and I think it might be a dead end. But if such an approach has any hope of success, I think it's going to have to try to create a situation where most of the administration that you need to do can be done most of the time with some sort of restricted superuser privileges, and only in extreme scenarios do you need to change the cluster state to allow full superuser access. There's no such nuance in your proposal. It's just a great big switch that makes superuser mean either nothing, or all the things it means today. I don't think that's really a meaningful step forward. -- Robert Haas EDB: http://www.enterprisedb.com