Re: Hardening PostgreSQL via (optional) ban on local file system access
От | Jeff Davis |
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Тема | Re: Hardening PostgreSQL via (optional) ban on local file system access |
Дата | |
Msg-id | f5522e2d1be5c7fdc21fe8c77186b1208882f5e7.camel@j-davis.com обсуждение исходный текст |
Ответ на | Hardening PostgreSQL via (optional) ban on local file system access (Hannu Krosing <hannuk@google.com>) |
Ответы |
Re: Hardening PostgreSQL via (optional) ban on local file system access
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Список | pgsql-hackers |
On Sat, 2022-06-25 at 00:08 +0200, Hannu Krosing wrote: > Hi Pgsql-Hackers > > As part of ongoing work on PostgreSQL security hardening we have > added a capability to disable all file system access (COPY TO/FROM > [PROGRAM] <filename>, pg_*file*() functions, lo_*() functions > accessing files, etc) in a way that can not be re-enabled without > already having access to the file system. That is via a flag which > can > be set only in postgresql.conf or on the command line. How much of this can be done as a special extension already? For instance, a ProcessUtility_hook can prevent superuser from executing COPY TO/FROM PROGRAM. As others point out, that would still leave a lot of surface area for attacks, e.g. by manipulating the catalog. But it could be a starting place to make attacks "harder", without core postgres needing to make security promises that will be hard to keep. Regards, Jeff Davis
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