Re: [HACKERS] pg_user "sealed"
От | jwieck@debis.com (Jan Wieck) |
---|---|
Тема | Re: [HACKERS] pg_user "sealed" |
Дата | |
Msg-id | m0y744C-000BFRC@orion.SAPserv.Hamburg.dsh.de обсуждение исходный текст |
Ответ на | pg_user "sealed" (The Hermit Hacker <scrappy@hub.org>) |
Ответы |
Re: [HACKERS] pg_user "sealed"
Re: [HACKERS] pg_user "sealed" |
Список | pgsql-hackers |
Marc wrote: > > > Okay... > > I've modified initdb.sh so that ALL is revoked from pg_user, with > a view being created to look into it for usename and usesysid, which are > required by psql... > > This gets it so that psql works for \d > > I tried to do a rewrite rule on db_user such that password would > become '*********', but that does't appear to work? > > Reports of any problems associated with any of the pg_ system > tables, please let me know Since you changed ACL_WORLD_DEFAULT to ACL_NO too, there are now problems on \d <table> (pg_attribute: Permission denied). And thus I expect more problems. I think users should have SELECT permission on non-critical system catalogs by default. But I don't think that setting explicit GRANT's on all the system catalogs is a good thing. Due to the ACL parsing I would expect some loss of performance. So if the relname is given to acldefault() in utils/adt/acl.c, it can do a IsSystemRelationName() on it and return ACL_RD instead of ACL_WORLD_DEFAULT. Jan -- #======================================================================# # It's easier to get forgiveness for being wrong than for being right. # # Let's break this rule - forgive me. # #======================================== jwieck@debis.com (Jan Wieck) #
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