Re: [HACKERS] pg_user "sealed"

On Mon, 23 Feb 1998, Jan Wieck wrote:

>
> Marc wrote:
> >
> >
> > Okay...
> >
> >    I've modified initdb.sh so that ALL is revoked from pg_user, with
> > a view being created to look into it for usename and usesysid, which are
> > required by psql...
> >
> >    This gets it so that psql works for \d
> >
> >    I tried to do a rewrite rule on db_user such that password would
> > become '*********', but that does't appear to work?
> >
> >    Reports of any problems associated with any of the pg_ system
> > tables, please let me know
>
>     Since  you changed ACL_WORLD_DEFAULT to ACL_NO too, there are
>     now problems on \d <table> (pg_attribute: Permission denied).
>     And  thus  I expect more problems.  I think users should have
>     SELECT permission on non-critical system catalogs by default.

    Okay, I've just been adding in appropriate 'GRANT SELECT's inside
of initdb.sh, for lack of a better idea...

>     But  I  don't  think that setting explicit GRANT's on all the
>     system catalogs is a good thing. Due to  the  ACL  parsing  I
>     would expect some loss of performance.
>
>     So   if   the   relname   is   given   to   acldefault()   in
>     utils/adt/acl.c, it can do a IsSystemRelationName() on it and
>     return ACL_RD instead of ACL_WORLD_DEFAULT.

    ...which this definitely sound like :)  Want to make the change
and send me a patch?