Re: Replace current implementations in crypt() and gen_salt() to OpenSSL
От | Peter Eisentraut |
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Тема | Re: Replace current implementations in crypt() and gen_salt() to OpenSSL |
Дата | |
Msg-id | b9f8300c-812a-4f01-9525-2cc1091be22f@eisentraut.org обсуждение исходный текст |
Ответ на | Re: Replace current implementations in crypt() and gen_salt() to OpenSSL (Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>) |
Ответы |
Re: Replace current implementations in crypt() and gen_salt() to OpenSSL
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Список | pgsql-hackers |
On 16.02.24 14:30, Daniel Gustafsson wrote: >> On 16 Feb 2024, at 13:57, Peter Eisentraut <peter@eisentraut.org> wrote: >> >> On 16.02.24 10:16, Daniel Gustafsson wrote: >>>> 2. The crypt() and gen_salt() methods built on top of them (modes of operation, kind of) are not FIPS-compliant. >>> I wonder if it's worth trying to make pgcrypto disallow non-FIPS compliant >>> ciphers when the compiled against OpenSSL is running with FIPS mode enabled, or >>> raise a WARNING when used? It seems rather unlikely that someone running >>> OpenSSL with FIPS=yes want to use our DES cipher without there being an error >>> or misconfiguration somewhere. >> >> I wonder on what level this kind of check would be done. For example, the password hashing done for SCRAM is not FIPS-complianteither, but surely we don't want to disallow that. > > Can you elaborate? When building with OpenSSL all SCRAM hashing will use the > OpenSSL implementation of pg_hmac and pg_cryptohash, so it would be subject to > OpenSSL FIPS configuration no? Yes, but the overall methods of composing all this into secrets and protocol messages etc. are not covered by FIPS. >> Maybe this should be done on the level of block ciphers. So if someone wanted to add a "crypt-aes" module, that wouldthen continue to work. > > That's a fair point, we can check individual ciphers. I'll hack up a version > doing this. Like, if we did a "crypt-aes", would that be FIPS-compliant? I don't know.
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