Re: Replace current implementations in crypt() and gen_salt() to OpenSSL
От | Robert Haas |
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Тема | Re: Replace current implementations in crypt() and gen_salt() to OpenSSL |
Дата | |
Msg-id | CA+TgmoapPRHmFKPbnL90jomKv3Yrs2odA4gVN4UgBA6PjLsHiw@mail.gmail.com обсуждение исходный текст |
Ответ на | Re: Replace current implementations in crypt() and gen_salt() to OpenSSL (Peter Eisentraut <peter@eisentraut.org>) |
Ответы |
Re: Replace current implementations in crypt() and gen_salt() to OpenSSL
Re: Replace current implementations in crypt() and gen_salt() to OpenSSL |
Список | pgsql-hackers |
On Tue, Feb 20, 2024 at 4:49 PM Peter Eisentraut <peter@eisentraut.org> wrote: > I think there are several less weird ways to address this: > > * Just document it. > > * Make a pgcrypto-level GUC setting. > > * Split out these functions into a separate extension. > > * Deprecate these functions. > > Or some combination of these. I don't think the first two of these proposals help anything. AIUI, FIPS mode is supposed to be a system wide toggle that affects everything on the machine. The third one might help if you can be compliant by just choosing not to install that extension, and the fourth one solves the problem by sledgehammer. Does Linux provide some way of asking whether "fips=1" was specified at kernel boot time? -- Robert Haas EDB: http://www.enterprisedb.com
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