Re: Password identifiers, protocol aging and SCRAM protocol
От | Heikki Linnakangas |
---|---|
Тема | Re: Password identifiers, protocol aging and SCRAM protocol |
Дата | |
Msg-id | 753ff453-b6b6-56c6-9b73-8190731a5f87@iki.fi обсуждение исходный текст |
Ответ на | Re: Password identifiers, protocol aging and SCRAM protocol (Michael Paquier <michael.paquier@gmail.com>) |
Ответы |
Re: Password identifiers, protocol aging and SCRAM protocol
Re: Password identifiers, protocol aging and SCRAM protocol |
Список | pgsql-hackers |
So, the consensus so far seems to be: We don't want the support for multiple password verifiers per user. At least not yet. Let's get SCRAM working first, in a way that a user can only have SCRAM or an MD5 hash stored in the database, not both. We can add support for multiple verifiers per user, password aging, etc. later. Hopefully we'll make some progress on those before 9.7 is released, too, but let's treat them as separate issues and focus on SCRAM. I took a quick look at the patch set now again, and except that it needs to have the multiple password verifier support refactored out, I think it's in a pretty good shape. I don't like the pg_upgrade changes and its support function, that also seems like an orthogonal or add-on feature that would be better discussed separately. I think pg_upgrade should just do the upgrade with as little change to the system as possible, and let the admin reset/rehash/deprecate the passwords separately, when she wants to switch all users to SCRAM. So I suggest that we rip out those changes from the patch set as well. In related news, RFC 7677 that describes a new SCRAM-SHA-256 authentication mechanism, was published in November 2015. It's identical to SCRAM-SHA-1, which is what this patch set implements, except that SHA-1 has been replaced with SHA-256. Perhaps we should forget about SCRAM-SHA-1 and jump straight to SCRAM-SHA-256. RFC 7677 also adds some verbiage, in response to vulnerabilities that have been found with the "tls-unique" channel binding mechanism: > To be secure, either SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS and SCRAM-SHA-1-PLUS MUST be > used over a TLS channel that has had the session hash extension > [RFC7627] negotiated, or session resumption MUST NOT have been used. So that doesn't affect details of the protocol per se, but once we implement channel binding, we need to check for those conditions somehow (or make sure that OpenSSL checks for them). Michael, do you plan to submit a new version of this patch set for the next commitfest? I'd like to get this committed early in the 9.7 release cycle, so that we have time to work on all the add-on stuff before the release. - Heikki
В списке pgsql-hackers по дате отправления: