Re: [GENERAL] SHA1 on postgres 8.3
От | Svenne Krap |
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Тема | Re: [GENERAL] SHA1 on postgres 8.3 |
Дата | |
Msg-id | 47F554CB.3020409@krap.dk обсуждение исходный текст |
Ответ на | Re: [GENERAL] SHA1 on postgres 8.3 (Sam Mason <sam@samason.me.uk>) |
Ответы |
Re: [GENERAL] SHA1 on postgres 8.3
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Список | pgsql-hackers |
Sam Mason wrote:<br /><blockquote cite="mid:20080403182304.GK6870@frubble.xen.chris-lamb.co.uk" id="mid_20080403182304_GK6870_frubble_xen_chris-lamb_co_uk"type="cite"><pre wrap="">Are you a cryptanalyst and are you surethat this doesn't actually make things worse? I'm sure it gives you a warm fuzzy feeling that it's *got* to be better, but unless someone has done some hard maths I'm not sure how you can be so sure. </pre></blockquote> No sadly I am no cryptoanalyst. <br /><blockquote cite="mid:20080403182304.GK6870@frubble.xen.chris-lamb.co.uk" id="mid_20080403182304_GK6870_frubble_xen_chris-lamb_co_uk"type="cite"><pre wrap=""> Why not just use SHA-512, you get many more quality bits that way. </pre></blockquote> I would, if it was available in core.<br/><blockquote cite="mid:20080403182304.GK6870@frubble.xen.chris-lamb.co.uk" id="mid_20080403182304_GK6870_frubble_xen_chris-lamb_co_uk"type="cite"><pre wrap=""> </pre><blockquote id="StationeryCiteGenerated_2"type="cite"><pre wrap="">I would drop md5 totally and use sha1 and ripemd-160 if possible..but currently i use only md5 as it is the only available one.. Loading pgcrypto is overkill for something as simple as hash-functions. </pre></blockquote><pre wrap="">Sounds like a good reasonfor moving the current md5 function out into pgcrypto as well! :) </pre></blockquote> I am not sure how I am to understand that comment. But again I am just a user...<br/><blockquote cite="mid:20080403182304.GK6870@frubble.xen.chris-lamb.co.uk" id="mid_20080403182304_GK6870_frubble_xen_chris-lamb_co_uk"type="cite"><blockquote id="StationeryCiteGenerated_3" type="cite"><prewrap="">* I prepend the id and the username to guard users with weak passwords against known hashvalues (rainbow tables) should the box ever get comprised ... </pre></blockquote><pre wrap=""> I take it your threat model doesn't include the attacker logging incoming queries to look for the clear-text password. </pre></blockquote> No it doesn't, I am mostly concerned with the graband run scenario. <br /><br /> I am still convinced having more (and better) hash-functions in core is a gain for someusers. <br /><br /> And it is fairly un-intrusive as the hash functions are well-defined and never going to change (newones can be added and old ones deleted, but SHA256 for example will never change). <br /><br /> I think I will drop theissue as I cannot present formal proof of my case, sorry to have wasted your time.<br /><br /> Svenne
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