Re: [GENERAL] SHA1 on postgres 8.3
От | Sam Mason |
---|---|
Тема | Re: [GENERAL] SHA1 on postgres 8.3 |
Дата | |
Msg-id | 20080403182304.GK6870@frubble.xen.chris-lamb.co.uk обсуждение исходный текст |
Ответ на | Re: [GENERAL] SHA1 on postgres 8.3 (Svenne Krap <svenne@krap.dk>) |
Ответы |
Re: [GENERAL] SHA1 on postgres 8.3
Re: [GENERAL] SHA1 on postgres 8.3 |
Список | pgsql-hackers |
On Thu, Apr 03, 2008 at 07:07:56PM +0200, Svenne Krap wrote: > I currently save only md5(id || username || 'password')* into password, > if I had access to sha1 (for example) i would add another password > column so, having for example > > ID serial > Username varchar > Password_md5 varchar > Password_sha1 varchar > > No matter how you see it, I get more bits of hash to check against. Are you a cryptanalyst and are you sure that this doesn't actually make things worse? I'm sure it gives you a warm fuzzy feeling that it's *got* to be better, but unless someone has done some hard maths I'm not sure how you can be so sure. Why not just use SHA-512, you get many more quality bits that way. > I would drop md5 totally and use sha1 and ripemd-160 if possible.. but > currently i use only md5 as it is the only available one.. Loading > pgcrypto is overkill for something as simple as hash-functions. Sounds like a good reason for moving the current md5 function out into pgcrypto as well! :) > * I prepend the id and the username to guard users with weak passwords > against known hashvalues (rainbow tables) should the box ever get > comprised ... I take it your threat model doesn't include the attacker logging incoming queries to look for the clear-text password. Sam
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