Re: Possible major bug in PlPython (plus some other ideas)
От | teg@redhat.com (Trond Eivind Glomsrød) |
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Тема | Re: Possible major bug in PlPython (plus some other ideas) |
Дата | |
Msg-id | xuyu1w38zxm.fsf@halden.devel.redhat.com обсуждение исходный текст |
Ответ на | Re: Possible major bug in PlPython (plus some other ideas) (Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>) |
Ответы |
Re: Possible major bug in PlPython (plus some other ideas)
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Список | pgsql-hackers |
Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us> writes: > Hannu Krosing <hannu@tm.ee> writes: > >> However, the default behavior of the restricted execution environment > >> being used allows read-only filesystem access. > > > we have 'read-only filesystem access anyhow' : > > > pg72b2=# create table hack(row text); > > CREATE > > pg72b2=# copy hack from '/home/pg72b2/data/pg_hba.conf' DELIMITERS > > '\01'; > > Only if you're superuser, which is exactly the point of the trusted > vs untrusted function restriction. The plpython problem lets > non-superusers read any file that the postgres user can read, which > is not cool. If a fix is made, will it be backported to the 7.1 branch so vendors can upgrade their packages if this is necesarry? -- Trond Eivind Glomsrød Red Hat, Inc.
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