Re: [HACKERS] Running pgindent
От | jwieck@debis.com (Jan Wieck) |
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Тема | Re: [HACKERS] Running pgindent |
Дата | |
Msg-id | m0y5yu0-000BFRC@orion.SAPserv.Hamburg.dsh.de обсуждение исходный текст |
Ответ на | Re: [HACKERS] Running pgindent (Bruce Momjian <maillist@candle.pha.pa.us>) |
Ответы |
Re: [HACKERS] Running pgindent
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Список | pgsql-hackers |
Bruce wrote: > This sounds great to me. As you have added to RangeTableEntry, I assume > you also added the needed fields to copyfuncs.c/outfuncs.c/makefuncs.c > and anywhere else that needs it. I will add this to the developers FAQ. Only to copyfuncs.c now. Is it possible that they get output/reread after deepRewriteQuery()?. I don't think so. And since makenode() initializes the allocated memory to nulls aclSkip defaults to false. > > We add a bool to pg_class that let's the rewrite handler know > > if he really should set the aclSkip defaulting to false. On > > ownership changes this flag is reset to false and only the > > owner or superusers might set it. > > No, that is not what I was saying. If they can create views, the can > change pg_rewrite, and because we now take the view as the owners > permission granting, someone could change anything in pg_rewrite and > make it look like it is a view of someone else. They could change the > view text to look at pg_user, for example. Instead of granting users access to pg_rewrite we should use again some mechanism in rewriteDefine/ExecCheckPerms to let users only create rules through the CREATE RULE command. Not by INSERT INTO pg_rewrite. Then we can check during the creation of a rule that the user is the owner of the relation the rule is on. Totally safe then. Until later, Jan -- #======================================================================# # It's easier to get forgiveness for being wrong than for being right. # # Let's break this rule - forgive me. # #======================================== jwieck@debis.com (Jan Wieck) #
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