Re: AW: [HACKERS] Solution to the pg_user passwd problem !?? (c)
От | jwieck@debis.com (Jan Wieck) |
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Тема | Re: AW: [HACKERS] Solution to the pg_user passwd problem !?? (c) |
Дата | |
Msg-id | m0y5aIl-000BFRC@orion.SAPserv.Hamburg.dsh.de обсуждение исходный текст |
Ответ на | Re: AW: [HACKERS] Solution to the pg_user passwd problem !?? (c) (jwieck@debis.com (Jan Wieck)) |
Ответы |
Re: AW: [HACKERS] Solution to the pg_user passwd problem !?? (c)
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Список | pgsql-hackers |
I wrote: > The 'grant select' on views is a IMHO urgent required > feature. I'll take a look on the code checking permissions > and the rewrite system. Interesting - first of all an unprivileged user cannot create any view "pg_rewrite: Permission denied". I think this is absolutely wrong. Anyway - if we add a flag to the rangetable entry that tells the executor in ExecCheckPerms() if this rte came from the rewriting due to a view or not, it can skip the permission check on that and the tests will pass. But then we'll run into a little security hole problem. If the permissions only rely on access to the view, the view owner (or public as long as ACL_WORLD_DEFAULT contains ACL_RD) can select throug the view. So we must check on view creation that the creator of the view has proper permissions to what the view selects. And in addition if not all objects the view selects are granted to public, we should automagically revoke public from the view so the creator must explicitly grant access to the view. Anything forgotten? Jan -- #======================================================================# # It's easier to get forgiveness for being wrong than for being right. # # Let's break this rule - forgive me. # #======================================== jwieck@debis.com (Jan Wieck) #
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