Re: Cutting support for OpenSSL 1.0.1 and 1.0.2 in 17~?
От | Peter Eisentraut |
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Тема | Re: Cutting support for OpenSSL 1.0.1 and 1.0.2 in 17~? |
Дата | |
Msg-id | eac70d46-e61c-4d71-a1e1-78e2bfa19485@eisentraut.org обсуждение исходный текст |
Ответ на | Re: Cutting support for OpenSSL 1.0.1 and 1.0.2 in 17~? (Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>) |
Ответы |
Re: Cutting support for OpenSSL 1.0.1 and 1.0.2 in 17~?
Re: Cutting support for OpenSSL 1.0.1 and 1.0.2 in 17~? Re: Cutting support for OpenSSL 1.0.1 and 1.0.2 in 17~? |
Список | pgsql-hackers |
On 06.04.24 19:47, Daniel Gustafsson wrote: > In bumping we want to move to 1.1.1 since that's the first version with the > rewritten RNG which is fork-safe by design, something PostgreSQL clearly > benefits from. I think it might be better to separate this into two steps: 1. Move to 1.1.0. This is an API update. Change OPENSSL_API_COMPAT, and remove a bunch of code that no longer needs to be conditional. We could check for a representative function like OPENSSL_init_ssl() in configure/meson, or we could just let the compilation fail with older versions. 2. Move to 1.1.1. I understand this has to do with the fork-safety of pg_strong_random(), and it's not an API change but a behavior change. Let's make this association clearer in the code. For example, add a version check or assertion about this into pg_strong_random() itself. I don't know how LibreSSL interacts with either of these two points. That's something that could be clearer. Some more detailed review on the v6 patch: * doc/src/sgml/libpq.sgml This small documentation patch could be committed forthwith. * src/backend/libpq/be-secure-openssl.c +#include <openssl/bn.h> This patch doesn't appear to add anything, so why does it need a new include? Could the additions of SSL_OP_NO_CLIENT_RENEGOTIATION and SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW be separate patches? * src/common/hmac_openssl.c There appears to be some unrelated refactoring happening here? * src/include/common/openssl.h Is the comment no longer applicable to OpenSSL, only to LibreSSL? * src/port/pg_strong_random.c I would prefer to remove pg_strong_random_init() if it's no longer useful. I mean, if we leave it as is, and we are not removing any callers, then we are effectively continuing to support OpenSSL <1.1.1, right?
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