Re: Authentication fails for md5 connections if ~/.postgresql/postgresql.{crt and key} exist
От | Jim Jones |
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Тема | Re: Authentication fails for md5 connections if ~/.postgresql/postgresql.{crt and key} exist |
Дата | |
Msg-id | dc014858-2478-14a5-491d-d63b0d6808e8@uni-muenster.de обсуждение исходный текст |
Ответ на | Re: Authentication fails for md5 connections if ~/.postgresql/postgresql.{crt and key} exist (Jacob Champion <jchampion@timescale.com>) |
Ответы |
Re: Authentication fails for md5 connections if ~/.postgresql/postgresql.{crt and key} exist
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Список | pgsql-hackers |
Hi Jacob, > I think the sslcertmode=disable option that I introduced in [1] solves this issue too; Well, I see there is indeed a significant overlap between our patches - but yours has a much more comprehensive approach! If I got it right, the new slcertmode=disable would indeed cancel the existing certs in '~/.postgresql/ in case they exist. Right? + if (conn->sslcertmode[0] == 'd') /* disable */ + { + /* don't send a client cert even if we have one */ + have_cert = false; + } + else if (fnbuf[0] == '\0') My idea was rather to use the existing sslmode with a new option "no-clientcert" that does actually the same: /* sslmode no-clientcert */ if (conn->sslmode[0] == 'n') { fnbuf[0] = '\0'; } ... if (fnbuf[0] == '\0') { /* no home directory, proceed without a client cert */ have_cert = false; } I wish I had found your patchset some months ago. Now I hate myself for the duplication of efforts :D What is the status of your patchset? Cheers Jim
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