Re: SCRAM with channel binding downgrade attack
| От | Peter Eisentraut |
|---|---|
| Тема | Re: SCRAM with channel binding downgrade attack |
| Дата | |
| Msg-id | b0bed5b2-2ab7-764e-437d-613d5094294f@2ndquadrant.com обсуждение исходный текст |
| Ответ на | Re: SCRAM with channel binding downgrade attack (Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka@iki.fi>) |
| Ответы |
Re: SCRAM with channel binding downgrade attack
|
| Список | pgsql-hackers |
On 23/05/2018 08:46, Heikki Linnakangas wrote: > "tls-unique" and "tls-server-end-point" are overly technical to users. > They don't care which one is used, there's no difference in security. A question was raised about this in a recent user group meeting. When someone steals the server certificate from the real database server and sets up a MITM with that certificate, this would pass tls-server-end-point channel binding, because both the MITM and the real server have the same certificate. But with tls-unique they would have different channel binding data, so the channel binding would detect this. Is that not correct? -- Peter Eisentraut http://www.2ndQuadrant.com/ PostgreSQL Development, 24x7 Support, Remote DBA, Training & Services
В списке pgsql-hackers по дате отправления: