Re: pgsql: Fix search_path to a safe value during maintenance operations.
От | Joe Conway |
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Тема | Re: pgsql: Fix search_path to a safe value during maintenance operations. |
Дата | |
Msg-id | a35ef296-9438-2194-9c6c-807b2f174b0c@joeconway.com обсуждение исходный текст |
Ответ на | Re: pgsql: Fix search_path to a safe value during maintenance operations. (Robert Haas <robertmhaas@gmail.com>) |
Ответы |
Re: pgsql: Fix search_path to a safe value during maintenance operations.
Re: pgsql: Fix search_path to a safe value during maintenance operations. |
Список | pgsql-hackers |
On 7/31/23 12:53, Robert Haas wrote: > On Fri, Jun 30, 2023 at 3:41 AM Jeff Davis <pgsql@j-davis.com> wrote: >> I'm not sure that everyone in this thread realizes just how broken it >> is to depend on search_path in a functional index at all. And doubly so >> if it depends on a schema other than pg_catalog in the search_path. >> >> Let's also not forget that logical replication always uses >> search_path=pg_catalog, so if you depend on a different search_path for >> any function attached to the table (not just functional indexes, also >> functions inside expressions or trigger functions), then those are >> already broken in version 15. And if a superuser is executing >> maintenance commands, there's little reason to think they'll have the >> same search path as the user that created the table. >> >> At some point in the very near future (though I realize that point may >> come after version 16), we need to lock down the search path in a lot >> of cases (not just maintenance commands), and I don't see any way >> around that. > > I agree. I think there are actually two interrelated problems here. > > One is that virtually all code needs to run with the originally > intended search_path rather than some search_path chosen at another > time and maybe by a different user. If not, it's going to break, or > compromise security, depending on the situation. The other is that > running arbitrary code written by somebody else as yourself is > basically instant death, from a security perspective. I agree too. But the analysis of the issue needs to go one step further. Even if the search_path does not change from the originally intended one, a newly created function can shadow the intended one based on argument coercion rules. -- Joe Conway PostgreSQL Contributors Team RDS Open Source Databases Amazon Web Services: https://aws.amazon.com
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