Re: Temporary file access API
От | Bruce Momjian |
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Тема | Re: Temporary file access API |
Дата | |
Msg-id | YldN261PrsUUTOVL@momjian.us обсуждение исходный текст |
Ответ на | Re: Temporary file access API (Robert Haas <robertmhaas@gmail.com>) |
Ответы |
Re: Temporary file access API
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Список | pgsql-hackers |
On Mon, Apr 11, 2022 at 04:34:18PM -0400, Robert Haas wrote: > On Mon, Apr 11, 2022 at 4:05 AM Antonin Houska <ah@cybertec.at> wrote: > > There are't really that many kinds of files to encrypt: > > > > https://wiki.postgresql.org/wiki/Transparent_Data_Encryption#List_of_the_files_that_contain_user_data > > > > (And pg_stat/* files should be removed from the list.) > > This kind of gets into some theoretical questions. Like, do we think > that it's an information leak if people can look at how many > transactions are committing and aborting in pg_xact_status? In theory > it could be, but I know it's been argued that that's too much of a > side channel. I'm not sure I believe that, but it's arguable. > Similarly, the argument that global/pg_internal.init doesn't contain > user data relies on the theory that the only table data that will make > its way into the file is for system catalogs. I guess that's not user > data *exactly* but ... are we sure that's how we want to roll here? I don't think we want to be encrypting pg_xact/, so they can get the transaction commit rate from there. -- Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us> https://momjian.us EDB https://enterprisedb.com Indecision is a decision. Inaction is an action. Mark Batterson
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