Re: Speed of SSL connections; cost of renegotiation
От | Curt Sampson |
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Тема | Re: Speed of SSL connections; cost of renegotiation |
Дата | |
Msg-id | Pine.NEB.4.51.0304111202060.7976@angelic-vtfw.cvpn.cynic.net обсуждение исходный текст |
Ответ на | Speed of SSL connections; cost of renegotiation (Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>) |
Ответы |
Re: Speed of SSL connections; cost of renegotiation
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Список | pgsql-hackers |
On Thu, 10 Apr 2003, Tom Lane wrote: > So, questions for the group: where did the decision to renegotiate every > 64K come from? Do we need it at all? Do we need it at such a short > interval? And if we do need it, shouldn't the logic be symmetric, so > that renegotiations are forced during large input transfers as well as > large output transfers? Yes, you do want renegotiations, for two reasons. One is that if you use the same key over a long period of time, you offer too much same-keyed cryptographic material to an attacker, and increase his chances of a successful attack. The second is that you limit the amount of data that can be compromised should someone get hold of your current key. (Though if they've got that from your server, they've probably got access to the database itself, too, so I wouldn't worry so much about this.) I don't actually know how often you should renegotiate, but I'd guess that 64K is really very much not the right value. It's probably not enough for DES, and is way too much for anything else. One hour seems to be a popular session key renegotiation interval for SSH and IPSec; why not start with that? If you really are concerned, I can ask an expert. And yes, both ends should renegotiate. cjs -- Curt Sampson <cjs@cynic.net> +81 90 7737 2974 http://www.netbsd.org Don't you know, in this new Dark Age, we're alllight. --XTC
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