Re: AW: [HACKERS] Solution to the pg_user passwd problem !?? (c)

On Thu, 19 Feb 1998, Bruce Momjian wrote:

> >
> > On Thu, 19 Feb 1998, Bruce Momjian wrote:
> >
> > > >
> > > > On Thu, 19 Feb 1998, Bruce Momjian wrote:
> > > >
> > > > > >     Just curious, but why don't the copy command fall under the same
> > > > > > grant/revoke restrictions in the first place?  It sounds to me like we are
> > > > > > backing off of the problem instead of addressing it...
> > > > >
> > > > > grant/revoke works for copy.
> > > >
> > > >     Ah, okay, so when we have it setup so that a view overrides the
> > > > 'grant' of a select, then we're fine?
> > >
> > > Yep, but can we do that in nine days, and be sure it is tested?
> >
> >     I don't think so...but I'rather have the obviuos "select * from
> > pg_user" closed off, and the more obscure "copy pg_user to stdout" still
> > there then have both wide open...its a half measure, but its better then
> > no measure...
>
> But it is not secure.  Why have passwords then?

    passswords had to get in there at *some* point...they are there
now, now we have to extend the security to the next level.  Better to move
forward 1 step at a time.  If we remove the REVOKE altogether, the
passwords are still there, but there is *0* security instead of 50%
security...

    So, I think we should leave the REVOKE/GRANT in initdb, and work
at having grant/revoke work on a view (such that a view overrides the
revoke of all on pg_user) so that it is appliable *after* v6.3 is
released, and available as (if possible) a patch for just after...

    We aren't hurting anything by leaving the REVOKE/GRANT in place,
but I think we are if we remove it and just leave it wide open...