Re: pg_amcheck option to install extension
От | Mark Dilger |
---|---|
Тема | Re: pg_amcheck option to install extension |
Дата | |
Msg-id | FF80A50B-96BE-457F-B115-D65FF50CE50E@enterprisedb.com обсуждение исходный текст |
Ответ на | Re: pg_amcheck option to install extension (Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>) |
Ответы |
Re: pg_amcheck option to install extension
Re: pg_amcheck option to install extension |
Список | pgsql-hackers |
> On Apr 19, 2021, at 9:22 PM, Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz> wrote: > > On Mon, Apr 19, 2021 at 08:39:06PM -0700, Mark Dilger wrote: >> This is a classic privilege escalation attack. Bob has one >> privilege, and uses it to get another. > > Bob is a superuser, so it has all the privileges of the world for this > instance. In what is that different from BASE_BACKUP or just COPY > FROM PROGRAM? I think you are conflating the concept of an operating system adminstrator with the concept of the database superuser/owner. If the operating system user that postgres is running as cannot execute any binaries, then "copy from program"is not a way for a database admistrator to escape the jail. If Bob does not have ssh access to the system, he cannotrun pg_basebackup. > I am not following your argument here. The argument is that the operating system user that postgres is running as, perhaps user "postgres", can read the files inthe $PGDATA directory, but Bob can only see the MVCC view of the data, not the raw data. Installing contrib/amcheck allowsBob to get a peak behind the curtain. — Mark Dilger EnterpriseDB: http://www.enterprisedb.com The Enterprise PostgreSQL Company
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