Re: Preventing indirection for IndexPageGetOpaque for known-size page special areas
От | Peter Geoghegan |
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Тема | Re: Preventing indirection for IndexPageGetOpaque for known-size page special areas |
Дата | |
Msg-id | CAH2-WznCiRnYaDmHv-HMzYX+6eo2pGaU4n9h09Xnz6jSFjL4mA@mail.gmail.com обсуждение исходный текст |
Ответ на | Re: Preventing indirection for IndexPageGetOpaque for known-size page special areas (Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>) |
Список | pgsql-hackers |
On Thu, Apr 7, 2022 at 1:09 PM Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net> wrote: > > > I got that much, of course. That will work, I suppose, but it'll be > > > the first and last time that anybody gets to do that (unless we accept > > > it being incompatible with encryption). > > > > Yeah. > > I don't know that I agree with this being the 'first and last time'..? > If we have two options that could work together and each need some > amount of per-page space, such as a nonce or authentication tag, we'd > just need to be able to track which of those are enabled (eg: through > pg_control) and then know which gets what space. Sounds very messy. > I don't see why we > couldn't add something today and then add something else later on. That's what I'm arguing in favor of, in part. > I'm also doubtful about how well this would work, but the other question > is- what would be the advantage to doing it this way? If we could have > it be run-time instead of initdb-time, that'd be great (imagine a > database that's encrypted while another isn't in the same cluster, or > even individual tables, which would all be very cool), but I don't think > this approach would make that possible..? That would be the main advantage, yes. But I also tend to doubt that we should make it completely impossible to know anything at all about the page without fully decrypting it. It was just a suggestion. I will leave it at that. -- Peter Geoghegan
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