Re: [HACKERS] Support for Secure Transport SSL library on macOS asOpenSSL alternative
| От | Michael Paquier |
|---|---|
| Тема | Re: [HACKERS] Support for Secure Transport SSL library on macOS asOpenSSL alternative |
| Дата | |
| Msg-id | CAB7nPqT_cMrKTm5Uw83LSS1Ah7azkqb_Y+YJDPR+ar4S2f0ApA@mail.gmail.com обсуждение исходный текст |
| Ответ на | Re: [HACKERS] Support for Secure Transport SSL library on macOS asOpenSSL alternative (Michael Paquier <michael.paquier@gmail.com>) |
| Ответы |
Re: [HACKERS] Support for Secure Transport SSL library on macOS asOpenSSL alternative
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| Список | pgsql-hackers |
On Mon, Aug 21, 2017 at 9:46 AM, Michael Paquier <michael.paquier@gmail.com> wrote: > On Mon, Aug 21, 2017 at 6:21 AM, Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se> wrote: >> I think the intended use case of the GUC should drive the decision on fallback. >> If the GUC isn’t supposed to be a way to figure out if the server was built >> with SSL support, then not existing in non-SSL backends is fine. If, however, >> we want to allow using the GUC to see if the server has SSL support, then there >> needs to be a “None” or similar value for that case. > > Only GUCs related to debugging have their existence defined based on a > #define, so it seems to me that if Postgres is compiled without any > SSL support, this parameter should still be visible, but set to > "none". The last set of patches available here does not apply: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/B5E2B87D-3E8A-4597-9A7F-8489B3B67556@yesql.se The SSL test refactoring is one cause. I think as well that this is crashing when attempting to use SCRAM authentication with the SSL brand of macos and SCRAM's channel binding. I am going to send a patch which allows handling of no support for channel bindings for a given SSL implementation, something needed as well by the gnutls patch. Please make sure that you define at least be_tls_get_peer_finished() and pgtls_get_finished() with a NULL result and a length of 0 as return results as, as far as I can see, macos does not give direct access to the TLS finish message bytes. At least that's not documented. -- Michael
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