Re: [HACKERS] SCRAM authentication, take three
| От | Michael Paquier |
|---|---|
| Тема | Re: [HACKERS] SCRAM authentication, take three |
| Дата | |
| Msg-id | CAB7nPqRkvOaacg+Bu8rtJbcPXU2T7AUDOg-9AdZHnuJ4_X+ePw@mail.gmail.com обсуждение исходный текст |
| Ответ на | Re: [HACKERS] SCRAM authentication, take three (Robert Haas <robertmhaas@gmail.com>) |
| Ответы |
Re: [HACKERS] SCRAM authentication, take three
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| Список | pgsql-hackers |
On Sat, Apr 8, 2017 at 1:59 AM, Robert Haas <robertmhaas@gmail.com> wrote: > On Fri, Apr 7, 2017 at 3:59 AM, Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka@iki.fi> wrote: >> I think the "SCRAM" part is more important than "SHA-256", so -1 on that. > > I agree. The point here isn't that we're using a better hashing > method, even if a lot of people *think* that's the point. The point > is we're using a modern algorithm that has nice properties like "you > can't impersonate the client by steeling the verifier, or even by > snooping the exchange". > > But "sasl" might be even better. FWIW, my opinion has not changed much on the matter, I would still favor "sasl" as the keyword used in pg_hba.conf. What has changed in my mind though is that defining no mechanisms with an additional option mean that all possible choices are sent to the client. But if you define a list of mechanisms, then we'll just send back to the client the specified list as a possible choice of exchange mechanism: host all all blah.com sasl mechanism=scram-sha-256-plus Here for example the user would not be allowed to use SCRAM-SHA-256, just SCRAM with channel binding. Such an option makes sense once we add support for one more mechanism in SASL, like channel binding, but that's by far a generic approach that can serve us for years to come, and by admitting that nothing listed means all possible options we don't need any immediate action. -- Michael
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