Re: Information of pg_stat_ssl visible to all users
От | Michael Paquier |
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Тема | Re: Information of pg_stat_ssl visible to all users |
Дата | |
Msg-id | CAB7nPqR2Pk6eX9A2ns7rf-rpG+Cdq79rV_gXAQMF6aYD-HTEsA@mail.gmail.com обсуждение исходный текст |
Ответ на | Re: Information of pg_stat_ssl visible to all users (Magnus Hagander <magnus@hagander.net>) |
Ответы |
Re: Information of pg_stat_ssl visible to all users
Re: Information of pg_stat_ssl visible to all users |
Список | pgsql-hackers |
On Mon, Aug 31, 2015 at 9:04 PM, Magnus Hagander <magnus@hagander.net> wrote: > > > On Sun, Aug 30, 2015 at 5:35 AM, Michael Paquier <michael.paquier@gmail.com> > wrote: >> >> >> >> On Sun, Aug 30, 2015 at 5:27 AM, Bruce Momjian wrote: >>> >>> I know I am coming in late here, but I know Heroku uses random user >>> names to allow a cluster to have per-user databases without showing >>> external user name details: >>> [...] >>> I can see them having problems with a user being able to see the SSL >>> remote user names of all connected users. >> >> >> Yep, and I can imagine that this is the case of any company managing cloud >> nodes with Postgres embedded, and at least to me that's a real concern. > > > > How is it a concern that a CN field with a random username in it is > visible, when showing the actual random username isn't? That's not very > consistent... How can you be sure as well that all such deployments would use random CN fields and/or random usernames? We have no guarantee of that as well. -- Michael
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