Re: RFC: Non-user-resettable SET SESSION AUTHORISATION
От | Robert Haas |
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Тема | Re: RFC: Non-user-resettable SET SESSION AUTHORISATION |
Дата | |
Msg-id | CA+TgmoaUav+WNGDDqhQ3CCZeGtrGotjoGfUJqkhgwgPZbLUf0g@mail.gmail.com обсуждение исходный текст |
Ответ на | Re: RFC: Non-user-resettable SET SESSION AUTHORISATION (Simon Riggs <simon@2ndQuadrant.com>) |
Ответы |
Re: RFC: Non-user-resettable SET SESSION AUTHORISATION
Re: RFC: Non-user-resettable SET SESSION AUTHORISATION |
Список | pgsql-hackers |
On Tue, May 19, 2015 at 3:00 PM, Simon Riggs <simon@2ndquadrant.com> wrote: > As long as the cookie is randomly generated for each use, then I don't see a > practical problem with that approach. If the client sets the cookie via an SQL command, that command would be written to the log, and displayed in pg_stat_activity. A malicious user might be able to get it from one of those places. A malicious user might also be able to just guess it. I don't really want to create a situation where any weakess in pgpool's random number generation becomes a privilege-escalation attack. A protocol extension avoids all of that trouble, and can be target for 9.6 just like any other approach we might come up with. I actually suspect the protocol extension will be FAR easier to fully secure, and thus less work, not more. -- Robert Haas EnterpriseDB: http://www.enterprisedb.com The Enterprise PostgreSQL Company
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