Re: [HACKERS] Monitoring roles patch
От | Robert Haas |
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Тема | Re: [HACKERS] Monitoring roles patch |
Дата | |
Msg-id | CA+TgmoZ5zs50mEzALJqp3qBMC+CdT0ccnjvNJt1Ojiu9rz35zw@mail.gmail.com обсуждение исходный текст |
Ответ на | Re: [HACKERS] Monitoring roles patch (Dave Page <dpage@pgadmin.org>) |
Ответы |
Re: [HACKERS] Monitoring roles patch
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Список | pgsql-hackers |
On Wed, Mar 22, 2017 at 7:48 AM, Dave Page <dpage@pgadmin.org> wrote: >> I'd be inclined to skip the rest of >> this. If an individual user wants to grant that bundle of privileges >> to a role, they can do it with or without pg_monitor. > > GRANT cannot be used in all cases, as some of the functions changed > have hard-coded superuser checks. In those cases, I've added > pg_monitor membership to the permission checks in the C code. Oh. Well, why not just control access using the permissions checking mechanism entirely, without hardcoding any OID? > The reason for having the role is to minimise the amount of work > required by the user to setup a role for the purposes of monitoring > the server. This is a practice which is seen in other DBMSs for > usability. > > With the patch, complex monitoring systems can easily be setup with > something like: > > CREATE ROLE monitoring_user LOGIN; > GRANT pg_monitor TO monitoring_role; > > Without, the users setting up their monitoring system will have to run > a much more complex set of GRANTs, almost certainly requiring > scripting. But that script is easy to provide, probably not very long, and could be bundled in an extension if it's helpful. I'm wary of committing ourselves to a specific decision about what pg_monitor includes; that seems like it could result in endless future litigation every time somebody wants to make a change. In contrast, nobody's going to have any question at all about the remit of pg_read_all_settings. -- Robert Haas EnterpriseDB: http://www.enterprisedb.com The Enterprise PostgreSQL Company
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