Re: [RFC] A tackle to the leaky VIEWs for RLS
От | Merlin Moncure |
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Тема | Re: [RFC] A tackle to the leaky VIEWs for RLS |
Дата | |
Msg-id | AANLkTilAuZfb4oI7zT1I94DkO6PWk7tPEtWWaGT04Ul5@mail.gmail.com обсуждение исходный текст |
Ответ на | Re: [RFC] A tackle to the leaky VIEWs for RLS (Robert Haas <robertmhaas@gmail.com>) |
Ответы |
Re: [RFC] A tackle to the leaky VIEWs for RLS
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Список | pgsql-hackers |
On Tue, Jun 1, 2010 at 1:28 PM, Robert Haas <robertmhaas@gmail.com> wrote: > On Tue, Jun 1, 2010 at 1:02 PM, Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us> wrote: >> Robert Haas <robertmhaas@gmail.com> writes: >>> On Tue, Jun 1, 2010 at 10:57 AM, Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us> wrote: >>>> CREATE SECURITY VIEW, anyone? >> >>> That may be the best approach, but I think it needs more than one line >>> of exposition. The approach I proposed was to test whether the user >>> has privileges to execute the underlying query directly without going >>> through the view. If so, we needn't be concerned. If not, then we >>> start thinking about which functions/operators we trust. >> >> Ummm ... that makes semantics dependent on the permissions available at >> plan time, whereas what should matter is the permissions that exist at >> execution time. Maybe that's all right for this context but it doesn't >> seem tremendously desirable. > > Ugh. I hope there's a way around that problem because AFAICS the > alternative is a world of hurt. If we're not allowed to take the > security context into account during planning, then we're going to > have to make worst-case assumptions, which sounds really unpleasant. > >>> Perhaps there is some value to having a knob that goes the opposite >>> directions and essentially says "I don't really care whether this view >>> is leaky from a security perspective". But presumably we don't want >>> to deliver that behavior by default and require the user to ask for a >>> SECURITY VIEW to get something else - if anything, we'd want CREATE >>> VIEW to create the normal (secure) version and add CREATE LEAKY VIEW >>> to do the other thing. >> >> -1 on that. We will get far more pushback from people whose application >> performance suddenly went to hell than we will ever get approval from >> people who actually need the feature. Considering that we've survived >> this long with leaky views, that should definitely remain the default >> behavior. > > Eh, if that's the consensus, it doesn't bother me that much, but it > doesn't really answer the question, either: supposing we add an > explicit concept of a security view, what should its semantics be? have you ruled out: 'create function'? :-) merlin
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