Re: Rejecting weak passwords
От | Magnus Hagander |
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Тема | Re: Rejecting weak passwords |
Дата | |
Msg-id | 9837222c0910200011x24759f9awe138e7ffa6b202d@mail.gmail.com обсуждение исходный текст |
Ответ на | Re: Rejecting weak passwords (Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>) |
Ответы |
Re: Rejecting weak passwords
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Список | pgsql-hackers |
2009/10/19 Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>: > I wrote: >> A server-side plugin can provide a guarantee that there are no bad >> passwords (for some value of bad, and with some possible adverse >> consequences). We don't have that today. > > BTW, it strikes me that ALTER USER RENAME introduces an interesting > hazard for such a plugin. Consider > > CREATE USER joe; > ALTER USER joe PASSWORD joe; -- presumably, plugin will reject this > ALTER USER joe PASSWORD mumblefrotz; -- assume this is considered OK > ALTER USER joe RENAME TO mumblefrotz; > > Now we have a user with name equal to password, which no sane security > policy will think is a good thing, but the plugin had no chance to > prevent it. The big difference is that you need to be superuser to change the name of a user, but not to change your own password. I know for example the Windows password policy thing has the same issue - if you rename the user, it doesn't have the password around to check, but you are an administrator so that's considered ok. -- Magnus HaganderMe: http://www.hagander.net/Work: http://www.redpill-linpro.com/
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