Re: Recent vendor SSL renegotiation patches break PostgreSQL
От | Michael Ledford |
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Тема | Re: Recent vendor SSL renegotiation patches break PostgreSQL |
Дата | |
Msg-id | 8adf46ea1002030852w1250e47bu18055e49b2778a10@mail.gmail.com обсуждение исходный текст |
Ответ на | Re: Recent vendor SSL renegotiation patches break PostgreSQL (Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>) |
Ответы |
Re: Recent vendor SSL renegotiation patches break
PostgreSQL
|
Список | pgsql-hackers |
On Wed, Feb 3, 2010 at 11:09 AM, Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us> wrote: > > Renegotiation after X amount of data is the recommended method AFAIK, > because it limits the volume of data available to cryptanalysis. > What makes you think that elapsed time is relevant at all? > > regards, tom lane You are correct. In that volume of data also matters. It depends on what kind of attack you are trying to minimize here. In my particular use case I fluctuate between idle and busy but mostly low bandwidth. You have four different primary cases that you are possible: 1) timed method on an idle link (or low usage) 2) timed method on a busy link (or high usage) 3) data limit on an idle link (or low usage) 4) data limit on a busy link (or high usage) The timed method is more optimal for case 1. The data limit is more optimal for case 4. Case 2 gives an attacker more data to do crypto-analysis. Case 3 gives an attacker more time to work with the current secret key on a live link. Depending on your use case, being able to work with a live link is worse than working with the data postmortem. There is I'm sure some hybrid in the middle between these where optimal lives. Michael
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