Re: Make PGOAUTHCAFILE in libpq-oauth work out of debug mode
| От | Jonathan Gonzalez V. |
|---|---|
| Тема | Re: Make PGOAUTHCAFILE in libpq-oauth work out of debug mode |
| Дата | |
| Msg-id | 7a0e58c5fdaa3686ea0a157ff937fe38954cda8c.camel@gmail.com обсуждение исходный текст |
| Ответ на | Re: Make PGOAUTHCAFILE in libpq-oauth work out of debug mode (Jacob Champion <jacob.champion@enterprisedb.com>) |
| Ответы |
Re: Make PGOAUTHCAFILE in libpq-oauth work out of debug mode
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| Список | pgsql-hackers |
Hi! On Mon, 2025-11-03 at 08:24 -0800, Jacob Champion wrote: > > But I ran into this annoyance (wanted to override the CA for > temporary > development purposes, got sprayed with debug output) during a demo > just last month, so I'm in favor of doing something to make this > easier. I was creating some demo too, at the beginning was really useful, but after some seconds, I used to lose the URL and the code, the URL wasn't an issue later, but the code it was. > > > Jonathan, the patch itself claims to handle two cases. What's the > production use case where a company has its own CA isolated from the > Internet but isn't willing to add that CA to the system trust? Well, there's a couple of cases, I figure out after the first email, thanks to Alvaro, that I wasn't clear in the comments, probably I should change it, will try to describe a few cases that I've seen over the years. * In Kubernetes, even with a network isolation, people use to prefer having TLS connections, just because it's the standard, but in internal communications (between namespaces and pods), these domains contain the format: <service>.<namespace>.svc.<clustername>.local, as you can already imagine, this kind of domain cannot be verified by an external CA, but they can be generated and verified with an internal CA. Now the question is, why they don't add this CA to every distribution? The defacto standard way to do this in Kubernetes is to take the CA from a ConfigMap or Secret (objects that can provide content inside the infrastructure) and deploy this dynamically inside the Pod, so, to indicate the path to this file, the standard is to use an environment variable, in this case, if the content of the ConfigMap or Secret changes, this will be refreshed inside the Pod too. * Big companies like those managing credit cards or big banks, use to have air gap environment, which may have exactly the same problem while communicating internally, the CA cannot verify an internal domain, on these cases the CA is usually moved around and installed in a specific path and installed on specific path and not the system path (usually because of compliant reasons), meaning that you will actually have to provide with a variable/configuration/environment the path to the CA. * Development cases, I think this is clear, but even when you're doing development, you'll be using a self-signed certificate, but doing developing and losing URL and the code it can be really common, it happened to me many times and it wasn't nice looking for the code. * CI cases, here, you'll not have time to get a certificate to just trigger an action against a one time domain, usually with a random domain to not conflict with other CI running at the same time, and you should never expose sensitive information on the CI output like the one exposes when enabling PGOAUTHDEBUG="UNSAFE" > The reason I ask is that we'd briefly talked about splitting > PGOAUTHDEBUG into more granular settings than just "off" and > "UNSAFE". I was thinking the same for another patch that will require discussion for sure, but it's something similar to add some levels of debug, for example, when you want to have the tokens or when you only want to see the URLs used to negotiate (which are really useful when working with the OAuth flows) or the deep one when you want to see the tokens. > So if this is a developer-only thing, we could maybe put some more > design work into the list of debug features. That list currently > includes the stderr spray, turning off HTTPS, allowing sub-second > ping > intervals, overriding the CA, debugging libpq-oauth link failures, > counting the calls to the flow -- all of which run the gamut from > "completely unsafe" to "completely safe". Ho! where can I see this list? I'd love to help with something here! I'm more than open to keep discussing this, because I can see that many people will be affected by the same, specially in the Kubernetes world. Thank your for looking at this! -- Jonathan Gonzalez V. <jonathan.abdiel@gmail.com>
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