Re: libpq compression
От | Florian Pflug |
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Тема | Re: libpq compression |
Дата | |
Msg-id | 7760EC03-5B38-4903-AD2D-95F787B1E1ED@phlo.org обсуждение исходный текст |
Ответ на | Re: libpq compression (Magnus Hagander <magnus@hagander.net>) |
Ответы |
Re: libpq compression
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Список | pgsql-hackers |
On Jun20, 2012, at 18:42 , Magnus Hagander wrote: > That is a very good point. Before we design *another* feature that > relies on it, we should verify if the syntax is compatible in the > other libraries that would be interesting (gnutls and NSS primarily), > and if it's not that at least the *functionality* exists ina > compatible way. So we don't put ourselves in a position where we can't > proceed. Hm, here's another problem with relying on SSL/TLS for compression. RFC2246, which defines TLS 1.0, explicitly states that "TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL is specified and is the initial state of a TLS connection during the first handshake on thatchannel, but MUST NOT be negotiated, as it provides no more protection than an unsecured connection." [RFC2246, A.5.The Cipher Suite] and that paragraph is still present in RFC5246 (TLS 1.2). The other cipher suits without actual encryption seem to be TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5 TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256 (TLS 1.2) Unless I'm missing something, that leaves us with no way of skipping the initial RSA handshake and also (more importantly) of computing a MD5 or SHA digest of every packet sent. I'm starting to think that relying on SSL/TLS for compression of unencrypted connections might not be such a good idea after all. We'd be using the protocol in a way it quite clearly never was intended to be used... best regards, Florian Pflug
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