Re: modules
От | Tom Lane |
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Тема | Re: modules |
Дата | |
Msg-id | 7616.1207339964@sss.pgh.pa.us обсуждение исходный текст |
Ответ на | Re: modules (Gregory Stark <stark@enterprisedb.com>) |
Ответы |
Re: modules
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Список | pgsql-hackers |
Gregory Stark <stark@enterprisedb.com> writes: > "Aidan Van Dyk" <aidan@highrise.ca> writes: >> What if you didn't need super-user privileges to load "C" functions, on >> the conditions that: >> 1) There is no / in the obj_file filename (or some other "sanitizing" >> rules) >> 2) You're database owner > That's an interesting idea. And utterly, utterly insecure. The fact that the referenced object file is a "trusted" Postgres module isn't enough to make it safe --- the user can still play hob with the system by creating functions with the wrong argument/result types, pointing at exported symbols that weren't meant to be callable functions, creating broken index opclasses from the functions, etc. I think you'd need to move the security gating up a level, and somehow see the SQL-language installation and deinstallation scripts as trusted. This goes back to the question of what is a module anyway. Like Andrew, I'm a bit disturbed that people feel free to propose to implement this stuff when they evidently have read none of the prior discussions. regards, tom lane
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