Re: exposing pg_controldata and pg_config as functions
От | Andres Freund |
---|---|
Тема | Re: exposing pg_controldata and pg_config as functions |
Дата | |
Msg-id | 71213C8E-F19A-4FAD-B2CD-D8F1210C60CC@anarazel.de обсуждение исходный текст |
Ответ на | Re: exposing pg_controldata and pg_config as functions (Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>) |
Список | pgsql-hackers |
On January 18, 2016 11:10:35 PM GMT+01:00, Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net> wrote: >* Robert Haas (robertmhaas@gmail.com) wrote: >> On Mon, Jan 18, 2016 at 4:43 AM, Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de> >wrote: >> > Meh, that seems pretty far into pseudo security arguments. >> >> Yeah, I really don't see anything in the pg_controldata output that >> looks sensitive. The WAL locations are the closest of anything, >> AFAICS. > >Heikki already showed how the WAL location information could be >exploited if compression is enabled. > >I believe that's something we should care about and fix in one way or >another (my initial approach was using defualt roles, but using the ACL >system and starting out w/ no rights granted to that function also >works). Sure. But it's pointless to make things more complicated when there's functions providing equivalent information already. --- Please excuse brevity and formatting - I am writing this on my mobile phone.
В списке pgsql-hackers по дате отправления: