Re: [HACKERS] Query cancel and OOB data
От | Tom Lane |
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Тема | Re: [HACKERS] Query cancel and OOB data |
Дата | |
Msg-id | 7099.896112868@sss.pgh.pa.us обсуждение исходный текст |
Ответ на | Re: [HACKERS] Query cancel and OOB data (Bruce Momjian <maillist@candle.pha.pa.us>) |
Список | pgsql-hackers |
Bruce Momjian <maillist@candle.pha.pa.us> writes: > Yes, that may be true. Not sure if having a single random() value can > predict the next one. If we just use on random() return value, I don't > think that is possible. In typical rand() implementations, having the whole of one output value is sufficient to give you all future outputs. That's why I recommended using only 8 bits from each of several outputs. I believe that is still breakable, but less trivially so. (I will be going on vacation Wednesday morning and don't have time to research better methods before then, but I do know they exist.) The real question we need to ask here is not the details of generating a one-time secret key, but what attacks we need to defend against and how to do that. A simple secret code per my original proposal is clearly not proof against a packet-sniffing attacker. Should we beef up the coding, or consider that such an attacker must be met directly by encrypting communications? If the latter, how do we encrypt the first packet sent to or from the postmaster? regards, tom lane
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