Re: For review: Server instrumentation patch

<snip good explanation. Thanks.>

> > Let me suggest another nice way for a superuser to do
> whatever he wants.
> > How about "CREATE UNTRUSTED PROCEDURAL LANGUAGE"? If you have say
> > pl/perl or pl/tcl on the system, you just create the
> untrusted version
> > and away you go - because they use the same .so.
>
> Yeah, I was thinking earlier about proposing that the trusted
> and untrusted versions need to be distinct .so's, so that the
> admin can physically remove the untrusted ones to prevent
> this scenario.
> But, again, the existence of security hole A is not
> justification for introducing security hole B.
>
> > Instead of trying to pick on one feature, how about trying
> something
> > constructive instead?
>
> That'd be fine with me --- but we have to introduce that
> *before* we add obvious new security risks, not after.

So what do you think of the proposed GUC?

Or what about a parameter to restrict both COPY and the utility
functions to certain subdirs only? (BTW, I was under the impression that
the admin functions were restricted to the pgdata directory already, but
I could be wrong - I don't have the latest version of the patch around)


//Magnus