Re: [PATCH] unalias of ACL_SELECT_FOR_UPDATE
От | Tom Lane |
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Тема | Re: [PATCH] unalias of ACL_SELECT_FOR_UPDATE |
Дата | |
Msg-id | 6167.1240239593@sss.pgh.pa.us обсуждение исходный текст |
Ответ на | Re: [PATCH] unalias of ACL_SELECT_FOR_UPDATE (Greg Stark <stark@enterprisedb.com>) |
Ответы |
Re: [PATCH] unalias of ACL_SELECT_FOR_UPDATE
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Список | pgsql-hackers |
Greg Stark <stark@enterprisedb.com> writes: > I think we're talking at cross purposes here. I think Kai Gai's > descriptions make sense if you start with a different set of > assumptions. The idea behind SELinux is that each individual object is > access controlled and each user has credentials which grant access to > specific operations on specific objects. As I understand it part of > the goal is to eliminate situations where "setuid" or other forms of > privilege escalation is required. Well, if so, the idea is a miserable failure. SELinux has just as many setuid programs as any other Unix, and absolutely zero hope of removing them. I am not going to take the idea of "remove setuid" seriously when they haven't been able to accomplish it anywhere else. regards, tom lane
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