Re: [HACKERS] PostgreSQL not setting OpenSSL session id context?
От | Andreas Karlsson |
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Тема | Re: [HACKERS] PostgreSQL not setting OpenSSL session id context? |
Дата | |
Msg-id | 56df06d3-1a27-66c3-992b-6675f839e59e@proxel.se обсуждение исходный текст |
Ответ на | Re: [HACKERS] PostgreSQL not setting OpenSSL session id context? (Shay Rojansky <roji@roji.org>) |
Список | pgsql-hackers |
On 08/04/2017 08:48 PM, Shay Rojansky wrote: > On 2017-08-04 07:22:42 +0300, Shay Rojansky wrote: > > I'm still not convinced of the risk/problem of simply setting the session > > id context as I explained above (rather than disabling the optimization), > > but of course either solution resolves my problem. > > How would that do anything? Each backend has it's own local > memory. I.e. any cache state that openssl would maintain wouldn't be > useful. If you want to take advantage of features around this you really > need to cache tickets in shared memory... > > Guys, there's no data being cached at the backend - RFC5077 is about > packaging information into a client-side opaque session ticket that > allows skipping a roundtrip on the next connection. As I said, simply > setting the session id context (*not* the session id or anything else) > makes this feature work, even though a completely new backend process is > launched. Yes, session tickets are encrypted data which is stored by the client. But if we are going to support them I think we should do it properly with new GUCs for the key file and disabling the feature. Using a key file is less necessary for PostgreSQL than for a web server since it is less common to do round robin load balancing between different PostgreSQL instances. Andreas
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