Re: [HACKERS] SCRAM authentication, take three
От | Heikki Linnakangas |
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Тема | Re: [HACKERS] SCRAM authentication, take three |
Дата | |
Msg-id | 54e29e46-6e89-a736-764d-90536568c079@iki.fi обсуждение исходный текст |
Ответ на | Re: [HACKERS] SCRAM authentication, take three (Peter Eisentraut <peter.eisentraut@2ndquadrant.com>) |
Ответы |
Re: [HACKERS] SCRAM authentication, take three
Re: [HACKERS] SCRAM authentication, take three Re: [HACKERS] SCRAM authentication, take three |
Список | pgsql-hackers |
On 04/11/2017 04:52 AM, Peter Eisentraut wrote: > On 4/10/17 04:27, Heikki Linnakangas wrote: >> One thing to consider is that we just made the decision that "md5" >> actually means "md5 or scram-sha-256". Extrapolating from that, I think >> we'll want "scram-sha-256" to mean "scram-sha-256 or scram-sha-256-plus" >> (i.e. the channel-bonding variant) in the future. And if we get support >> for scram-sha-512, "scram-sha-256" would presumably allow that too. > > But how would you choose between scram-sha-256-plus and scram-sha-512? Good question. We would need to decide the order of preference for those. That question won't arise in practice. Firstly, if the server can do scram-sha-256-plus, it presumably can also do scram-sha-512-plus. Unless there's a change in the way the channel binding works, such that the scram-sha-512-plus variant needs a newer version of OpenSSL or something. Secondly, the user's pg_authid row will contain a SCRAM-SHA-256 or SCRAM-SHA-512 verifier, not both, so that will dictate which one to use. - Heikki
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