Re: reducing our reliance on MD5
От | José Luis Tallón |
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Тема | Re: reducing our reliance on MD5 |
Дата | |
Msg-id | 54DB7B22.4040704@adv-solutions.net обсуждение исходный текст |
Ответ на | Re: reducing our reliance on MD5 (Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>) |
Ответы |
Re: reducing our reliance on MD5
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Список | pgsql-hackers |
On 02/11/2015 04:40 PM, Tom Lane wrote: > José Luis Tallón <jltallon@adv-solutions.net> writes: >> In any case, just storing the "password BLOB"(text or base64 encoded) >> along with a mechanism identifier would go a long way towards making >> this part pluggable... just like we do with LDAP/RADIUS/Kerberos/PAM today. > That's exactly the direction we must NOT go. > > Upgrading the security of stored passwords in pg_authid is at least as > important as upgrading the wire protocol security; very possibly more so. > Any solution that requires cleartext passwords to be kept by the server > is simply not going to be accepted. I definitively haven't explained myself properly. I *never* suggested storing plaintext in pg_authid, but using plaintext authentication (which can always be matched against an on-disk hash, whatever the type) as a fallback to allow for seamless upgrades of security. (once you are authenticated by using theold credentials, the server can transparently store the new hash) When I referred to a "text or base64 encoded" I never implied on-disk plaintext (unless the user specifically requires that, which they might). To avoid ambiguities, my proposal closely mimicks Dovecot's implementation of password schemes and credential upgrades http://wiki2.dovecot.org/Authentication/PasswordSchemes Thanks, J.L.
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