Re: [v9.4] row level security
От | Greg Smith |
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Тема | Re: [v9.4] row level security |
Дата | |
Msg-id | 52240A43.3000100@2ndQuadrant.com обсуждение исходный текст |
Ответ на | Re: [v9.4] row level security (Greg Stark <stark@mit.edu>) |
Ответы |
Re: [v9.4] row level security
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Список | pgsql-hackers |
On 9/1/13 5:54 PM, Greg Stark wrote: > So I think up above Tom is wrong about why it's ok that INSERT leaks > keys when it reports a unique key violation. The reason why it's ok > that there's a covert channel there is that the DBA can avoid that > covert channel by being careful when creating unique constraints. He > or she should be aware that creating a unique constraint implicitly > provides a kind of limited access to data to users who have INSERT > privilege even if they lack the real SELECT privilege. And if someone can INSERT values that they can't actually see once they're committed, that's a similarly bad we should describe. People should be dumping their trash in their neighbor's yard. I think eventually this needs to be wrestled to the ground in a robust way. I want to see if all unique violations might be changed to give less information in this sort of RLS context. One rough early idea is to create a new error condition that means you hit something protected by RLS, but doesn't leak any more information than that. Just a generic "Security restriction operation" that comes out of fishing for keys, inserting outside your area, etc. I want to think through some use cases and review the code to see whether that concept helps or not. -- Greg Smith 2ndQuadrant US greg@2ndQuadrant.com Baltimore, MD PostgreSQL Training, Services, and 24x7 Support www.2ndQuadrant.com
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