Re: [v9.2] Add GUC sepgsql.client_label
От | Yeb Havinga |
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Тема | Re: [v9.2] Add GUC sepgsql.client_label |
Дата | |
Msg-id | 4F27B605.8080802@gmail.com обсуждение исходный текст |
Ответ на | Re: [v9.2] Add GUC sepgsql.client_label (Robert Haas <robertmhaas@gmail.com>) |
Ответы |
Re: [v9.2] Add GUC sepgsql.client_label
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Список | pgsql-hackers |
On 2012-01-30 19:19, Robert Haas wrote: > On Sun, Jan 29, 2012 at 7:27 AM, Kohei KaiGai<kaigai@kaigai.gr.jp> wrote: >> However, I also assume one other possible use-case; the originator >> has privileges to translate 10 of different domains, but disallows to >> revert it. In this case, RESET without permission checks are harmful. >> (This scenario will be suitable with multi-category-model.) > Of course, we already have a trusted procedure mechanism which is > intended to support temporary changes to the effective security label, > so you might say, hey, people shouldn't do that. But they might. And I > wouldn't like to bet that's the only case that could be problematic > either. What about a setting in postgresql.conf? You could end up > being asked to set the security label to some other value before > you've initialized it. What about SET LOCAL? It's not OK to fail to > revert that at transaction exit. Hence my suggestion of a function: if > you use functions, you can implement whatever semantics you want. What about always allowing a transition to the default / postgresql.conf configured client label, so in the case of errors, or RESET, the transition to this domain is hardcoded to succeed. This would also be useful in conjunction with a connection pooler. This would still allow the option to prevent a back transition to non-default client labels. -- Yeb Havinga http://www.mgrid.net/ Mastering Medical Data
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