Re: W3C Specs: Web SQL
От | Charles Pritchard |
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Тема | Re: W3C Specs: Web SQL |
Дата | |
Msg-id | 4CD84320.4030400@jumis.com обсуждение исходный текст |
Ответ на | Re: W3C Specs: Web SQL (Alvaro Herrera <alvherre@commandprompt.com>) |
Ответы |
Re: W3C Specs: Web SQL
Re: W3C Specs: Web SQL W3C Specs: Web SQL Revisit |
Список | pgsql-hackers |
On 11/8/2010 7:55 AM, Alvaro Herrera wrote: > Excerpts from Charles Pritchard's message of sáb nov 06 23:20:13 -0300 2010: > >> Simple async sql sub-set (the spec in trouble): >> http://dev.w3.org/html5/webdatabase/ > This is insane. This spec allows the server to run arbitrary SQL > commands on the client, AFAICT. That seems like infinite joy for > malicious people running webservers. The more powerful the dialect of > SQL the client implements, the more dangerous it is. Because of a lack of "interested implementers", the spec does not put forward a standard dialect/subset. It simply uses Sqlite. Obviously, access should be restricted per the security section: a given domain may only run commands that modify its own database. Remember, this is client-side, in respect to "implementations". Each domain (origin) would behave as its own unique user with its own unique database (or namespace). That said, there are a few Server side JS apps around, and they're certainly more agile than browser vendors: the "openDatabase" command does not encompass credentials for multi-user situations in SSJS [again, because it's glued to the origin, on client-side]. With postgres current security options, I don't see that being a difficult issue.
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