Re: Block-level CRC checks
От | Heikki Linnakangas |
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Тема | Re: Block-level CRC checks |
Дата | |
Msg-id | 4B14CDF7.7030508@enterprisedb.com обсуждение исходный текст |
Ответ на | Re: Block-level CRC checks (Simon Riggs <simon@2ndQuadrant.com>) |
Ответы |
Re: Block-level CRC checks
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Список | pgsql-hackers |
Simon Riggs wrote: > There is no "creation" of corruption events. This scheme detects > corruption events that *have* occurred. Now I understand that we > previously would have recovered seamlessly from such events, but they > were corruption events nonetheless and I think they need to be reported. > (For why, see Conclusion #2, below). No, you're still missing the point. The point is *not* random bit errors affecting hint bits, but the torn page problem. Today, a torn page is a completely valid and expected behavior from the OS and storage subsystem. We handle it with full_page_writes, and by relying on the fact that it's OK for a hint bit set to get lost. With your scheme, a torn page would become a corrupt page. -- Heikki Linnakangas EnterpriseDB http://www.enterprisedb.com
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