Re: Kerberos authentication, Active Directory, and PostgreSQL
От | Heikki Linnakangas |
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Тема | Re: Kerberos authentication, Active Directory, and PostgreSQL |
Дата | |
Msg-id | 4AD466DF.7080004@enterprisedb.com обсуждение исходный текст |
Ответ на | Kerberos authentication, Active Directory, and PostgreSQL ("Turner, Ian" <Ian.Turner@deshaw.com>) |
Ответы |
Re: Kerberos authentication, Active Directory, and PostgreSQL
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Список | pgsql-bugs |
Turner, Ian wrote: > While trying to connect our PostgreSQL database to our Kerberos realm, we encountered the obscure message "Invalid messagelength". Tracking this down, we discovered that it was emitted by src/backend/libpq/pqcomm.c in response to a ratherlarge Kerberos message. The root cause is as follows, and a patch is below. > > The code in src/backend/libpq/auth.c contains a hard-coded limit on the size of GSS messages, and in particular on themessage containing the client's Kerberos ticket for the postgres server. The limit was 2,000 bytes, which is normallyadequate for tickets based on TGTs issued by Unix KDCs. However, TGTs issued by Windows domain controllers containan authorization field known as the PAC (privilege attribute certificate), which contains the user's Windows permissions(group memberships etc.). The PAC is copied into all tickets obtained on the basis of this TGT (even those issuedby Unix realms which the Windows realm trusts), and can be several K in size. Thus, GSS authentication was failingwith a "invalid message length" error. We simply upped the limit to 32k, which ought to be sufficient. > > The patch is quite brief: > > --- postgresql-8.4-8.4.1/src/backend/libpq/auth.c 2009-06-25 12:30:08.000000000 +0100 > +++ postgresql-8.4-8.4.1-fixed/src/backend/libpq/auth.c 2009-09-15 20:27:01.000000000 +0100 > @@ -166,6 +166,8 @@ > #endif > > static int pg_GSS_recvauth(Port *port); > + > +#define GSS_MAX_TOKEN_LENGTH (32767) > #endif /* ENABLE_GSS */ > > > @@ -937,7 +939,7 @@ > > /* Get the actual GSS token */ > initStringInfo(&buf); > - if (pq_getmessage(&buf, 2000)) > + if (pq_getmessage(&buf, GSS_MAX_TOKEN_LENGTH)) > { > /* EOF - pq_getmessage already logged error */ > pfree(buf.data); > > > Please let me know if anything additional is required in order to get this fix into the next release. The corresponding limit in pg_SSPI_recvauth() probably needs to be raised too.. pq_getmessage() doesn't necessarily need a limit, we could accept arbitrarily long tokens. Although I guess we want to avoid simple denial-of-service attacks exhausting backend memory. -- Heikki Linnakangas EnterpriseDB http://www.enterprisedb.com
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