Re: postgresql.key secure storage
От | John R Pierce |
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Тема | Re: postgresql.key secure storage |
Дата | |
Msg-id | 4AAD373A.2090306@hogranch.com обсуждение исходный текст |
Ответ на | postgresql.key secure storage ("Saleem EDAH-TALLY" <nmset@netcourrier.com>) |
Список | pgsql-general |
Saleem EDAH-TALLY wrote: > This concerns use of postgresql.key private key file on the client side. > > psql can't establish a connection. with an encrypted postgresql.key file. If > I'm wrong here, the following is invalid and please show me the steps I'm > ignoring. > > An application using libpq would require that the private unencrypted key be > deployed to the end user, together with the public key and trust cert. This > would mean if the end user is curious enough and computer litterate, he can > bypass the client application and make a direct connection to the server with > psql for example. It's then possible to issue commands like TRUNCATE TABLE... > sounds like you should be using a 3-tier architecture, where the application running on the untrusted user computer isn't allowed to directly connect to the database at all, rather, connects to middleware on a secured computer which executes all business logic and makes any database connections. of course, this moves the security issues to your client->server application protocol
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