Re: 8.4 release planning
От | Joshua Brindle |
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Тема | Re: 8.4 release planning |
Дата | |
Msg-id | 497F62EB.10500@manicmethod.com обсуждение исходный текст |
Ответ на | Re: 8.4 release planning (Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>) |
Ответы |
Re: 8.4 release planning
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Список | pgsql-hackers |
Stephen Frost wrote: > * Tom Lane (tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us) wrote: >> This seems to me to be exactly parallel to deciding that SELinux should >> control only table/column permissions within SQL; an approach that would >> be enormously less controversial, less expensive, and more reliable than >> what SEPostgres tries to do. > > While also ignoring a feature that is available, and used by these same > security communities, in other enterprise RDBMSs... > > http://www.securityfocus.com/infocus/1743 > > http://www.microsoft.com/technet/prodtechnol/sql/2005/multisec.mspx > > It's not codified in the SQL spec (yet..) that I saw, and maybe we could > seperate out the SE bits from the row-level bits, but I'm really not > sure I see the value in doing that.. They are separate. If you look at the patches you'll see a pgace part, this is where the core interfaces to the security backends, and you'll see a rowacl backend and an sepgsql backend. Personally I'd like to see all of the access control moved out to use pgace, including the standard DAC permissions but I doubt that would never happen.
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