Re: [JDBC] [HACKERS] Channel binding support for SCRAM-SHA-256
От | Álvaro Hernández Tortosa |
---|---|
Тема | Re: [JDBC] [HACKERS] Channel binding support for SCRAM-SHA-256 |
Дата | |
Msg-id | 49413008-40a0-3223-e957-c10d882e5119@8kdata.com обсуждение исходный текст |
Ответ на | Re: [JDBC] [HACKERS] Channel binding support for SCRAM-SHA-256 (Michael Paquier <michael.paquier@gmail.com>) |
Ответы |
Re: [JDBC] [HACKERS] Channel binding support for SCRAM-SHA-256
Re: [HACKERS] Channel binding support for SCRAM-SHA-256 |
Список | pgsql-hackers |
On 31/05/17 03:39, Michael Paquier wrote: > On Tue, May 30, 2017 at 5:59 PM, Robert Haas <robertmhaas@gmail.com> wrote: >> That sounds like undue optimism to me. Unless somebody's tested that >> Michael's proposed implementation, which uses undocumented OpenSSL >> APIs, actually interoperates properly with a SCRAM + channel binding >> implementation based on some other underlying SSL implementation, we >> can't really know that it's going to work. It's not like we're >> calling SSL_do_the_right_thing_for_channel_binding_thing_per_rfc5929(). >> We're calling SSL_do_something_undocumented() and hoping that >> something_undocumented == >> the_right_thing_for_channel_binding_thing_per_rfc5929. Could be true, >> but without actual interoperability testing it sounds pretty >> speculative to me. > Hm? Python is using that stuff for a certain amount of years now, for > the same goal of providing channel binding for SSL authentication. You > can look at this thread: > https://bugs.python.org/issue12551 > So qualifying that as a speculative method sounds a quite hard word to me. Actually this Python patch seems to ultimately rely on the same OpenSSL functions as your implementation. I don't have anything against implementing tls-unique, specially as per the RFC it is mandatory (if channel binding support is provided). However, given the use of undocumented API, given that at least the Java driver would have a very difficult time implementing it (basically replacing Java's standard SSL stack with a completely external one, BouncyCastle, which adds load, size and complexity), I would rather focus the efforts on tls-server-end-point which only needs to access the certificate data, something that most APIs/frameworks/languages seem to cover much more naturally than tls-unique. Both are equally safe and effective and so having support for both seems sensible to me. Álvaro -- Álvaro Hernández Tortosa ----------- <8K>data
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