Re: user-based query white list
От | Andrew Chernow |
---|---|
Тема | Re: user-based query white list |
Дата | |
Msg-id | 493D3CEF.6030701@esilo.com обсуждение исходный текст |
Ответ на | Re: user-based query white list (Andrew Dunstan <andrew@dunslane.net>) |
Список | pgsql-hackers |
Andrew Dunstan wrote: > > > Andrew Chernow wrote: >> >> I think what is missing is a way to deny the execution of queries that >> don't operate on an object (like a table, sequence, role, schema, >> etc...), OR queries not covered by the priv system. Object-based >> queries can be locked down using the existing priv system. Not sure >> if denying non-object related queries would work; what happens when >> you call "SELECT NOW()" within an allowed function? >> >> > > What exactly are you trying to protect against? > > In general, my attitude is that databases should not allow direct access > from untrusted sources. The API restriction you are talking about is > something that is trivially easy to build into middleware, and only the > middleware should be allowed access to the database. > > cheers > > andrew > > Well, it sounds like the ability to do what I am looking for is not available in the current feature set; that answers my first question. It also sounds like the backend can be patched in such a way that negates the need for middleware. I didn't really hear any convincing security implications from opening the backend up to world when using a white list; probably because it appears to lock it down. If there is something I'm missing, please let me know. The question I am really trying to answer is, what is required to safely remove a layer of abstraction and point of failure, not to mention an extra level of complexity? Previously, I labeled this as a hack. I was only referring to my implementation which is currently not very general purpose. I don't think the concept is a hack. Thanks, -- Andrew Chernow eSilo, LLC every bit counts http://www.esilo.com/
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