Re: Spoofing as the postmaster
От | Magnus Hagander |
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Тема | Re: Spoofing as the postmaster |
Дата | |
Msg-id | 4774009F.3040806@hagander.net обсуждение исходный текст |
Ответ на | Re: Spoofing as the postmaster (Tomasz Ostrowski <tometzky@batory.org.pl>) |
Список | pgsql-hackers |
Tomasz Ostrowski wrote: > On Sun, 23 Dec 2007, Tom Lane wrote: >> 3. Massive confusion and breakage as various people transition to the >> new standard at different times. > > As with any major version. No, it would introduce a client/server incompatibility. Generally, older clients (libpq) will still work fine with newer servers, or the other way around. Lots of attention is paid to maintaining that. >> 4. Potential to create, rather than remove, spoofing opportunities >> anyplace there is confusion about which port the postmaster is really >> listening on. > > I agree. But because it would just not work it'll be easy to notice > and correct. And when corrected it would be no more confusion. It would be a perfect spot to put in the MITM attack that this whole thread has been about... >> Fundamentally these are man-in-the-middle attacks, and the only real >> solution is mutual authentication. > > The problem is not many people expect man-in-the-middle attack on > secure lan, localhost or local socket connection, so they'll not try > to prevent it. There is no such thing as a secure LAN, unless you control every host and what every user can do on it. (Definition of LAN can be a bit different though. Say you implement proper IPsec isolation on it - in that case, only the machines on the inside of the ipsec "cloud" need to be trusted) Same thing really does go for the host - it's not a secure host if you can't control what the users are doing on it. So you can't treat it as such if that's the case. //Magnus
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