Re: Spoofing as the postmaster
От | Magnus Hagander |
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Тема | Re: Spoofing as the postmaster |
Дата | |
Msg-id | 476EDEC3.6080001@hagander.net обсуждение исходный текст |
Ответ на | Re: Spoofing as the postmaster (Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>) |
Список | pgsql-hackers |
Tom Lane wrote: > Tomasz Ostrowski <tometzky@batory.org.pl> writes: >> So I'm not very fond of this "insecure by default, it's your problem >> to make it secure" attitude. I'm the one who reported this. > > IIRC, you started out your argument by also saying that we had to move > the TCP socket to the reserved range, so as to prevent the equivalent > problem in the TCP case. (And, given the number of clients such as > JDBC that can only connect via TCP, it certainly seems there's little > point in changing the socket case if we don't change the TCP case.) It should also be noted that not all operating systems even have the concept of a reserved range of ports. > Fundamentally these are man-in-the-middle attacks, and the only real > solution is mutual authentication. Pretending that some quick-fix > change eliminates that class of problem is a recipe for building systems > that are less secure, not more so. And SSL can certainly do that. But I can agree that our SSL documentation could be much clearer on how to do things, and what's a best practice :-) Instead of just adding a section on "preventing spoofing attacks", perhaps what we really need is a general chapter on how to secure your system and what's best practices. Which would also cover things like don't run everything as superuser etc (which is a much more likely problem to be seen in deployments) //Magnus
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